Hutchinson sessions (see inventory of losses, Hosmer, p. 351) nothing could ever make good so senseless an act of vandalism. The experience left him embittered, accentuated his inborn, traditional distrust of the "common sort," and convinced him that a more strenuous rather than a more lenient policy was necessary. Hitherto he had taken the position that whereas Parliament had the right to govern the colonies as it pleased it would be wise not to insist on it (Hutchinson Correspondence, II, 89-91). Henceforth he was convinced that the colonies must be forced to recognize their subjection; and as early as 1766 he suggested that "to familiarize us" with the principle, no session should pass without "one or more acts of Parliament" intended to estab- lish its supremacy (Ibid., II, 228). In 1766 Hutchinson was dropped from the Council. Opposed to the Townshend duties (1767), he felt that, once passed, they should be strictly enforced. In the absence of Bernard (1769-71) he acted as governor, received his commission (made out in 1770) as governor in 1771, and served in that office until 1774. He did his duty scrupulously by following his in- structions without question. As his responsibili- ties increased and he became more unpopular, he became less the statesman and more the person- ally injured bureaucrat: colonial opposition he attributed largely to the disturbed state of Bos- ton, and the recalcitrance of Boston largely to the personal enmity of a few men, especially Otis and Samuel Adams. He twice asked the Coun- cil to call out the troops to suppress the disturb- ances caused by their presence, and later regret- ted that he had not done so on his own authority, believing that the "massacre" might thereby have been prevented. He welcomed the repeal of the major part of the Townshend duties, and regretted that the duty on tea was retained. The modification of the non-importation agreements (1770) pleased him, and he recognized that the controversy had quieted down. "We have not been so quiet these five years . . .," he writes in 1771; "if it were not for two or three Adamses we should do well enough" (Hosmer, p. 192). Samuel Adams himself was discouraged by the general apathy, affirming that the real danger was that the people would think there was no danger. A wise governor would have made the most of so favorable a situation; in fact Hutchin- son was the chief ally of Adams in reviving the waning controversy. For two years (1770-72) he engaged in an irritating and futile contro- versy with the House over its place of meeting, and other technical points of no importance. He was more Tory than the ministers, constantly Hutchinson complained to his friends in England that "his Majesty's servants" were not adequately sup- ported, and insisted that the "great thing now is to keep up the sense of our constitutional depen- dence and an opinion that Parliament will main- tain its supreme authority (Hutchinson Corre- spondence, III, 112). When Adams labored al- most alone to keep the dying controversy alive by writing embittered articles in the journals, the governor took "much pains to procure writ- ers to answer the pieces in the newspapers which do so much mischief" (Hosmer, p. 224). When Adams organized the correspondence committees in November 1772 and initiated the movement by publishing the "Rights of the Col- onists," Hutchinson gave life to the movement by delivering before the General Court, on Jan. 6, 1773, an elaborately argued address designed to prove that since "no line can be drawn be- tween the supreme authority of Parliament and the total independence of the colonies," the Par- liamentary supremacy must be admitted; and "if the supremacy of Parliament shall no longer be denied, it will follow that the mere exercise of its authority can be no grievance" (Hosmer, pp. 367-68). Learning that Dartmouth, who understood that the government of Massachu- setts called for something more than an exercise in dialectic, disapproved of his action, Hutchin- son was as much astonished as he was distressed, having really believed that his address would accomplish much towards ending the controversy (Hutchinson Correspondence, III, 443, 498). His position, already precarious, became unten- able after the publication of the "Hutchinson Letters," procured in England and sent to Bos- ton by Benjamin Franklin [q.v.']. The letters, six of which were written by Hutchinson to friends in England during the years 1768-69, expressed no views not already publicly ex- pressed, but they revealed the fact, which later letters would have revealed far more clearly, that Hutchinson was secretly urging the British gov- ernment to exert its authority over the colonies more vigorously. In any case, as Hutchinson said, had the letters "been Chevy Chase," the people would have believed them "full of evil and treason" (Hosmer, p. 278). Meantime the East India Company had been permitted by Par- liament to import tea directly into America in the expectation that by reducing the price the people would buy English rather than Dutch tea; and Hutchinson had unwisely used his in- fluence to obtain consignments for his sons, Thomas and Elisha, whose tea business he ap- pears to have largely directed. When the tea ships arrived, in December 1773, Hutchinson 441