Jackson

Bee had intended to apply to his brigade and
not to him personally. With prestige much in-
creased by this battle, Jackson became a major-
general on Oct. 7, 1861, and on Nov. 5 assumed
command in the Shenandoah Valley, a district
of the Department of Northern Virginia. The
next few months added nothing to his reputa-
tion. An unsuccessful raid against Romney in
January 1862, conducted in bitter weather, was
followed by a controversy with Brig.-Gen. W.
W. Loring, who insisted that Jackson had spared
his own troops and had put the burden of out-
post duty on Loring's command. Jackson imme-
diately preferred charges against Loring and
sought to bring him before a court martial.

On Mar. 8-9, Johnston evacuated Manassas,
retreating to the line of the Rappahannock, and
thereby forced Jackson, most unwillingly, to
abandon Winchester on Mar. n. This move
was the beginning of the Valley campaign of
1862, which many critics regard as the most
remarkable display of strategic science, based
on accurate reasoning, correct anticipation of
the enemy's plans, rapid marches, and judicious
disposition of an inferior force, in all American
military history. Marching up the Valley, Jack-
son turned on his pursuer, Maj.-Gen. James
Shields, under a misapprehension of the Federal
strength, and was repulsed with heavy losses at
Kernstown, near Winchester, on Mar. 23. This
engagement was accounted a defeat for Jackson,
and as it followed quickly on the Romney expe-
dition it destroyed the fame he had gained at
First Manassas (Bull Run). Rumor spread that
he was dangerously reckless and that he became
insane when excited. It was not until the cam-
paign had developed further that the Confeder-
acy realized how his daring attack on Shields
had alarmed the Federals and had led to the re-
tention in northern and western Virginia of
troops that otherwise would have strengthened
McClellan in his attack on Richmond.

From Apr. 17 to May 12, 1862, Jackson's
movements were under the supervision of Rob-
ert E. Lee. The two had known each other since
the Mexican War. Lee had recommended
Jackson for the post at Lexington and probably
was responsible for sending him to Harper's
Ferry. In perfect understanding, they devel-
oped a plan to attack Brig.-Gen. N. P. Banks
and thereby prevent the dispatch of troops from
Banks to McDowell, who was preparing to move
southward from Fredericksburg to join Mc-
Clellan in front of Richmond. As a preliminary,
Jackson attacked Milroy, commanding a part of
Fremont's army, at McDowell, west of Staun-
ton, on May 8. Before the situation had cleared

Jackson

up after this minor engagement, Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston, who had then brought his army close
to Richmond, resumed his direction of Jackson's
movement. Fearing that Banks was too strong-
ly entrenched at Strasburg to be attacked, John-
ston ordered part of Jackson's army from the
Valley, but Jackson saw his opportunity and ap-
pealed to Richmond. This was the real crisis of
the campaign. Lee approved a continuance of
the offensive, Jackson moved rapidly down the
Valley, struck Banks at Front Royal on May 23,
and on May 24-25 drove him through Winches-
ter and to the Potomac. The Lincoln adminis-
tration at once took alarm for the safety of
Washington and suspended the southward march
of McDowell, who was expected to unite with
McClellan in overwhelming Johnston near Rich-
mond. In its effects, this probably was Jack-
son's greatest single contribution to the South-
ern cause.

After pursuing Banks to the Potomac, Jack-
son was forced immediately to withdraw up the
Valley to protect his rear, threatened by Shields
from the east and by Fremont from the west
Although the line of the retreat of his 16,000
men was the objective of 62,000 Federals, Jack-
son escaped by rapid marching, and when he
had drawn the enemy to a favorable position he
prepared to attack his pursuers separately. His
margin of time was the narrowest, for Fremont
was advancing down the Valley west of the
Massanutton Mountains and Shields's division
was strung out from Luray southward. Taking
advantage of the ground, Ewell checked Fre-
mont at Cross Keys on June 8, and the next day
Jackson successfully attacked Shields's advanced
guard at Port Republic and hurled it back. This
was perhaps Jackson's most brilliant battle tac-
tically and it disclosed for the first time his great
skill in making rapid dispositions in the face
of the enemy. These two actions are better
known than the battle of Winchester and they
virtually paralyzed action by the divided Fed-
erals in Jackson's front, but the effects of these
two onslaughts were hardly as great as those
that followed the operations of May 23-25. The
great object of Jackson's campaign, which was
to prevent the dispatch of troops from northern
Virginia to the Richmond front, had already
been accomplished.

The withdrawal of Shields and Fremont end-
ed the Valley campaign. Lee, meantime, had
succeeded Johnston in command of the forces
around Richmond, which now became known
as the Army of Northern Virginia. His first
plan was to reenforce Jackson with troops from
the Carolinas and Georgia for a march into

557