Jackson

Pennsylvania, in the hope that this would draw
the Union armies from Richmond and the South
Atlantic seaboard, but the exposed states would
not consent to the transfer of the required troops.
Lee had accordingly to substitute a second plan,
involving a more limited offensive in the Valley
with a subsequent rapid movement of Jackson's
army to Richmond. To this end, Lawton's bri-
gade from Georgia and eight regiments under
Whiting from the Army of Northern Virginia
were sent to Jackson on June 8-11, 1862. The
Federals, however, had retreated too fast and
too far for this offensive to be completed in the
time Lee could allow. He accordingly ordered
Jackson to Richmond with nearly the whole of
his force and detrained him at Fredericks Hall
on June 23 in order to employ him in the Seven
Days' Campaign. Jackson, unfortunately, was
in a strange country and was physically worn
down from lack of sleep, on which he was very
dependent His march on June 26 was slow
and was so obstructed by the enemy that he did
not execute Lee's plan to turn Beaver Dam
Creek, thereby causing delay and a costly, futile
assault on Fitzjohn Porter by A. P. Hill. At
Gaines's Mill on June 27 Jackson's troops fought
well, and on the 29th they were sent in pursuit
of McClellan, who was changing his base from
the Pamunkey to the James. Jackson slept lit-
tle during this pursuit and on June 30, when he
arrived at White Oak Swamp, he was so close
to physical collapse that his mind did not func-
tion with its usual military precision and he did
not attempt to take a position no stronger than
several he successfully stormed when in good
physical condition. His failure to cross the
swamp that day contributed materially to the
disruption of Lee's elaborate plan for the envel-
opment of McClellan by simultaneous conver-
gence at Glendale on June 30. In the battle of
Malvern Hill on July i, the final action of the
campaign, Jackson had no conspicuous part.

On July 13, Jackson was detached and moved
to Gordonsville, whence his 24,000 men advanced
to Cedar Run and fought an inconclusive en-
gagement with Pope's army on Aug. 9. Lee soon
joined him and planned for Aug. 18 an offensive
that was delayed by a series of mishaps. On
Aug. 24, at a conference between them, a deci-
sion was reached to divide the army temporarily
and to send Jackson by way of Thoroughfare
Gap to Manassas Junction, Pope's advanced
base. Jackson at once began the most famous
of all his marches and covered fifty-one miles in
two days with 20,000 men. He destroyed the
enemy's base on Aug. 27, and then retired to a
well-chosen position at Groveton, six miles

Jackson

northwest of Manassas, there to hold the Fed-
erals at bay until Longstreet could join him. On
the 28th and 29th, most admirably feeding in his
reserves as needed, Jackson fought a stubborn
action, beat off all attacks and on Aug. 30-31
was still strong enough to share in the offensive
by which Pope was driven back to the Wash-
ington defenses (Second Bull Run). "Neither
strategically nor tactically did ... [Jackson]
make a single mistake" in this daring campaign
(Henderson, post, II, 235). To him, more than
to any of his lieutenants, Lee owed the success of
a turning movement that enabled him to con-
tinue the offensive and to carry the war into the
enemy's country.

By this time, Jackson had become a Southern
hero, and his "foot cavalry/' as his fast-march-
ing infantry was called, was the most famous of
Confederate commands. Although he shunned
all display and did nothing to evoke the causerie
de bivouac that Napoleon regarded as almost es-
sential to a general's success in creating morale,
Jackson had personal peculiarities that lent
themselves to legend. At thirty-eight he was
"Old Jack" to his adoring soldiers, who cheered
him tumultuously whenever they saw him, and
magnified his every eccentricity. He wore a
weather-beaten cap and gigantic boots, with the
plainest of uniforms. Riding an ugly horse at
the head of his column, and often mud-spattered,
he frequently was seen to lift one of his arms to
its full length above his head, as if invoking di-
vine blessing, though actually the gesture had
its origin in nothing more significant than a be-
lief that the arm was contracting and needed to
be stretched. His religious impulses were known
throughout the army. On the eve of battle, he
would rise several times during the night for
prayer, and he was so strict in his observance
of the Sabbath that he would not even write a
letter to his wife when he thought it would travel
in the mails on Sunday. His favorite company
was that of Presbyterian divines; his chosen
topic of conversation was theology. Stern and
exacting in discipline, he was uncommunicative
in his dealings with his subordinates. The great-
er their responsibility, the more he demanded of
them. Ewell said, "I never saw one of Jackson's
couriers approach without expecting an order
to assault the North Pole" (Henderson, I, 438),
and this officer, his most trusted lieutenant, was
firmly convinced that Jackson was insane. In
action, his eyes, which normally were somewhat
dreamy, would blaze with excitement, and until
the Second Manassas campaign he was sus-
pected of undue fondness for playing a lone
hand. He was absolutely loyal to Lee, however,

558