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ORGANON

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
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
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HAHNEMANN'S DEFENCE

OF THE

ORGANON OF RATIONAL MEDICINE

AND OF

HIS PREVIOUS HOMŒOPATHIC WORKS AGAINST
THE ATTACKS OF

PROFESSOR HECKER.

AN EXPLANATORY COMMENTARY ON THE HOMŒOPATHIC SYSTEM.

TRANSLATED BY

R. E. DUDGEON, M.D.

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Est interdum ita perspicua veritas, ut eam infirmare nulla res possit, tamen est adhibenda

interdum vis veritatis, ut crucialis. — CICERO, PRO QUINTO.

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PHILADELPHIA :

BOERICKE & TAFEL.

1896.

May 21, 1896
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WASHER
AND
MACHINE

INTRODUCTION BY TRANSLATOR.

THIS work, which has not hitherto been translated and has hardly excited the amount of interest it merits, though professedly written by Hahnemann's son Friedrich is evidently the work of the much more competent father, as proved not only by the style and by the learning it displays, but also conclusively, I would say, by Hahnemann's letter to the publisher Arnold, the original of which I have before me, and of which a translation will be found below.

Hahnemann's reason for making his son rather than himself appear as the author, may have been that he had expressed a resolution not to answer any of the criticisms that might be published respecting his novel doctrine. But the attacks of Professor Hecker, of Dresden, one of the most renowned authorities in medicine then existing, repeated from time to time during nearly fifteen years, and becoming ever more rancorous and calumnious as Hahnemann's system was slowly evolved and disclosed in his published works, beginning with the *Essay on a New Principle for Ascertaining the Curative Powers of Drugs* (published in 1796), through *Æsculapius in the Balance*, *The Medicine of Experience*, *Fragmenta de Viribus Medicamentorum Positivis* (all these published in 1805), *On the Value of the Speculative Systems of Medicine* (1808), and other less im-

portant works, down to the *Organon of Rational Medicine** (1810), exasperated Hahnemann to such a degree that he thought his great truth ran the risk of being overwhelmed unless an adequate reply were made to the criticisms that had accumulated to such a great extent on his laborious investigations and conscientious conclusions. As he probably felt too much contempt for his assailants to enter the lists against them in person, he resorted to the familiar device of employing another's name to endorse his opinions. Having at that time few or no adherents, he was limited in his choice of a literary representative to his own son Friedrich, at that time aged 24, a student of medicine preparing for examination in order to take his degree, and therefore fully employed on his own affairs, with no leisure to write such an elaborate defence of his father's system, were he capable of doing it, which I much doubt. As the publication of this masterly attack on an illustrious professor of the old school in Friedrich's name might have interfered with his chances of obtaining his degree, Hahnemann is careful to impress on his publisher, Arnold, that the book when printed was not to be on sale until after Friedrich had taken his degree, when it would be beyond the power of any professors or examiners to harm him.

This work is more especially interesting to all Hahnemann's disciples and admirers, as it is the only one in which he defends his teaching from the attacks of his opponents. From the title† it would seem that it is a defence

* In the subsequent editions "rational" was omitted.

† The title of the original is: "*Friedrich Hahnemann's, des Sohnes,*

of the *Organon* only, but the reader will find that it is also a reply to the adverse criticisms on all his previous homœopathic works. In short, it is a complete answer to all the objections made to his teaching, and it even carries the war into the enemy's territory, and delivers many doughty blows to the "scientific medicine" of the period. The style, like that of other of Hahnemann's works is rather involved and parenthetical, but this is owing to Hahnemann's scrupulous desire to make his meaning as precise and unmistakable as possible. The language is in some cases rather more forcible than we are now accustomed to in controversial writing, but this seems to have been a characteristic of the times, and that of Hahnemann's chief opponent, Professor Hecker, is certainly more distinguished for its *fortiter in re* than for its *suaviter in modo*. Hahnemann seems to have had a great admiration for Luther's style, which he sometimes approaches in the energy of his expressions.

I have not attempted to smooth the little asperities of diction in this work. My chief business has been to give as faithful a translation as possible, to alter the references to Hahnemann himself from the third to the first person. and to add a few explanatory notes, which are distinguished by being enclosed in rectangular brackets.

Widerlegung der Anfälle Hecker's auf das Organon der rationellen Heilkunde. Ein erläuternder Kommentar zur homöopathischen Heillehre." The literal translation of which is: "*Friedrich Hahnemann's (the son) Refutation of Hecker's attacks on the Organon of Rational Medicine. An explanatory Commentary on the Homœopathic medical doctrine.*"

LETTER FROM HAHNEMANN TO THE PUBLISHER.

My Dear Mr. Arnold: I wish you had read Hecker's abusive article against me; you would then think the *Refutation* is only too modest. You cannot wish that no reply should have been made by my son to these shameful accusations. In such cases every author is the best judge of what answer he should make. You then returned the MS., in order that some alterations should be made (who was it that marked these passages? Was it you or was it Roeber? If the latter, he must have already read the MS., and have considered the remainder faultless!) Look now, though the author did not consider it necessary, yet to please you he altered and modified those passages. You could not desire more nor did you ask more. And when this is done, and yet your censor does not allow the MS. to pass, it is not the author's fault that it is not printed, and that you should have made no preparation for printing it, as the censure was not justified.

Moreover, no censor can refuse to allow the printing of a defensive work in which the assailed is repulsed with actual libels (which is not the case in this MS.); for libels of private persons concern not the censor, but the author. If there are libels in the book, it is not the censor nor yet the publisher, but only the author who can be legally prosecuted. Consequently, what Mr. Roeber has written under the title is a sham pretext for his refusal. The true reason can be nothing else than the plain truths told of the medical art in the work. If insults could prevent the printing of a book, then Hecker's abusive work would never have passed the censors. But we must take into consideration the underhand, backbiting, sneaking ways for which Dresden is distinguished.

The truths of universal utility respecting the medical art contained in this book, and which constitute its chief value, would assuredly excite the opposition of the Leipzig professors, especially when they learn that its publication has been refused in Dresden. The plain truth it contains would only bring upon my son annoyance from his

teachers, under whom he must still remain for a short time, and by whom he will soon have to pass the examination for his degree. *As yet, none of the professors have seen the MS., though they will hear of it.*

The best plan would be to have the MS. printed in some small place where there does not exist any great prejudice in favor of the traditional medicine, out of which there is no salvation; where such (truthful) denials of its claims would not be thought so much of, or where the official doctor, if there is one and he is inclined to be nasty, may be bribed to keep quiet with a few thalers.

If you will adopt this plan, and assure me that copies of the book shall not be issued until my son has taken his degree, which he will do as soon as possible, then the MS. of the *Refutation* is still at your service, and then you shall get the *Materia Medica* also.

If it had been secretly printed in Dresden without the veto of the Holy Inquisition, then my son would have already got his degree before any particular notice had been taken of it in Leipzig. But now that so much fuss has been made about the thing in Leipzig, there is no other way to manage it but that which I have suggested. Nor can a *single word* more of the MS. be altered.

It is incredible that charges of heresy and the spirit of persecution could find a footing even in scientific matters, and display their tyranny; but it is so, as we see in this case.

But shall such a miserable charge of heresy prevent the most salutary truths being said and printed? *Freedom of action and liberty of the press* must prevail when grand new truths are to be communicated to the world. What could Luther have done with his splendid ideas if he had not been able to get them printed, if he could not have sent his outspoken solid truths hot from his heart to the press of his dear, courageous friend, the publisher and printer, Hans Luft, with all the hard words and abusive expressions he deemed useful for his purpose. Then everything that was necessary was printed, and it was only so, and in no other way, that the salutary Reformation could be effected. It is, of course, not necessary for me, like Luther, to abuse the Pope and call him an ass in my writings, but I and my son must be able to

say wholesome truths in order to bring about the much-needed reform in medicine. Hans Luft was almost as indispensable an instrument of the Reformation as Luther himself. I, too, require for the good cause as warm, as cordial a friend of the truth for my publisher as Luft was for Luther. But if I experience such great resistance, I cannot advance another step.

It is just the same with the *Materia Medica*. If the enemies of the truth are not either silenced or convinced and instructed by this defensive work, the *Materia Medica* must prove valueless. The public can make no use of it if the malicious objections of Hecker and his associates are not clearly shown to be the opposite of well-founded. If Hecker and opponents of his stamp remain unrefuted, I cannot with honor go on with the works of instruction I am engaged in, and the *Organon* too will be no longer esteemed. No one could believe the effect such mendacious representations have on the public.

If the *Refutation* does not appear, it will be thought that these slanderous accusations against me and my *Organon* were unrefutable, and I would be as it were excommunicated. No one would listen to what I say, even should I say the most salutary things. The prejudiced statements and miserable accusations of this more than spiteful man must be utterly smashed up, before I can continue my teaching work.

This is the state of the matter. It is for you to determine whether you can interest yourself sufficiently for the truth and the good cause as to remain my publisher. See if you can carry out my present wishes.

Yours with esteem,

DR. HAHNEMANN.

April 24th. [1811]

I have just heard from Leipzig that pressure is to be put upon my son to withdraw his work. I beg Mr. Voight to write *immediately* and tell Magister Schubert that the MS. business is already settled, and that he should leave my son alone.

DEFENCE OF THE ORGANON, ETC.

MY confidence in my countrymen makes me think that no honor-loving German can have read Hecker's 109 page long abusive articles against me (*Annalen der gesammten Medicin*,* July and September, 1810), without intense indignation; a feeling akin to that which the public manifested towards Klotz for having in his *Literaturbriefen*, bespattered the immortal Lessing and other distinguished men with his filthy venom.

Nature may have required at least half a century to produce in civilized countries a man who could take a heart-felt pleasure in attacking conspicuous merit and displaying towards it an animosity of the fiercest and bitterest character. Klotz and Hecker will always remain a remarkable manifestation of nature, as rare as it is defi-

* [The full title of the periodical is "*Annalen der gesammten Medicin als Wissenschaft und als Kunst, zur Beurtheilung ihrer neusten Erfindungen, Theorien, Systeme und Heilmethoden, von August Friederich Hecker.*" *Anglice*: "*Annals of all Medicine as Science and as Art, for judging of its newest discoveries, theories, systems, and methods of cure, by August Friederich Hecker.*" A most ambitious and comprehensive title, but apparently the enterprise did not meet with the success anticipated, for the periodical expired after an existence of only two years.]

cient in human charity. For fifteen years Hecker has been chiefly occupied in girding at my name, as may be seen in the yellow periodical he formerly edited and in other critical journals. I took no notice of these attacks as I considered them of no importance, indeed absolutely futile. But my silence was asserted by Hecker to prove that his arguments were irrefutable, and he became emboldened to write this last abusive paper (in the *Annalen* mentioned above), a genuine reflex of his real character!

I did not at first think this long tirade worth the trouble of answering, and resolved to continue to pursue my investigations without wasting time on this outburst of Heckerism; but I thought that, if I made no reply, Hecker might fancy that his futile objections and dogmatic assertions were of importance, as he has already scornfully asserted (p. 35); so as I am thoroughly convinced by experience of the value of my medical doctrines, I made up my mind to provide this slanderous article with a little *commentarius perpetuus*, in order to wake up Hecker out of his fool's paradise and to enlighten the public as to the true character of his performance.

In order to attack the subject on all points, Hecker brings before his judgment-seat some articles on the homœopathic method I wrote six years ago, with the object of discovering something to find fault with in these older writings.

To begin with, he asserts (p. 31): "As, hitherto, in these days of uncertainty, of controversy, of contradictions and of frequent changes of opinion, no Organon of Medicine

has proceeded from the rest of the profession,* so Hahnemann's *Organon of Rational Medicine* cannot be an *Organon*." This is just as well reasoned as if one were to say, as the theories respecting the movements of the celestial bodies from Ptolemy to Tycho Brahe are so inconsequent and contradictory, so the discovery of Copernicus cannot be the true doctrine.

He first criticises my *Fragmenta de viribus medicamentorum positivis*, published six years ago (Leipzig, 1805). This gives him a lot to do and causes him to offend frequently against truth and honesty.

At p. 36 he makes a very silly objection to "the completeness of the Index," which is a great boon to any one using the *Fragmenta*.

Farther (p. 37) he complains: "It is an abominable calumny when Hahnemann says in the Preface to the *Fragmenta*, that no physician has ever troubled himself about the effects of medicine on the healthy, and that, as a rule, physicians have not thought that a knowledge of the instruments of their art was necessary." Any one who reads this preface will see that I do not say what Hecker alleges, but this is what I do say: "No physician has held it to be his *chief duty* to obtain the *most perfect* knowledge of his instruments."† Rather a difference between "*most perfect*" and "*some*."

* A charming picture Hecker here draws of the medical science of himself and colleagues.

† Instrumentorum artis suae habere notitiam *quam maxime perfectam*, primum medici esse officium, nemo putat.

Medical men, and at their head Hecker himself, have certainly endeavored to obtain *some* knowledge of the medicines. But how far did the search after this knowledge go? Besides the natural history of the medicinal substance, the *materia medica* was derived from the blind *usus in morbis*,* and consisted partly of the domestic remedies of country-folk (who only employed simples, whereas the physician used only complex prescriptions) partly of some favorite medicines to which the physician arbitrarily ascribed the cure of his cases—though they were always given mixed up with a lot of others—partly of medicines whose remedial virtues were rashly deduced from their supposed chemical constituents, partly of drugs to which imaginary virtues were ascribed from some chimerical and

* The medicines in their *materia medica* are said by these physicians to be *absolutely* wholesome and *positively* and *entirely* curative. Every one who introduced a drug asserted that whenever he administered it he saw only good effects, it always cured; almost every one protests that in his hands it never did any harm or caused untoward symptoms, even when it did not do good (a manifest falsehood, as every medicine that does not do good always does harm). Others observed from some medicines given in large quantities occasionally obvious symptoms; but these they regarded as altogether mischievous, so they added what they call *corrigentia* to the prescription in order to deprive them of their bad qualities. But if the medicine is the suitable one there are *no* bad symptoms to be combated during the treatment. (*Organon*, §§ 130, 131), [5th Edit. §§ 154, 155]. One sees from this how far they are from recognizing in the untoward symptoms and the disagreeable sensations caused by medicines their true and sole remedial power. In their morbid effects the curative power of medicine is to be sought and found.

vague analogies, partly of remedies copied from untrustworthy books.

How far must the official *materia medica* be from containing a perfect account of the true effects of the instruments of cure?

In the preface to the *Fragmenta* it is not stated, as Hecker alleges, that "no physician has hitherto troubled himself about the effects of medicine on the healthy." In order to saddle me with this assertion, Hecker omits these words: "What effects the medicines produce of themselves, *i.e.*, what alterations they bring about in the healthy body *in order to ascertain for what diseases they are all appropriate*, no physician as far as I know, has ever made this his object;"* the whole passage which is printed in conspicuous type, "*in order to ascertain*," etc., is omitted and by this omission the sentence acquires quite another meaning, which appears to him more suited for his censure.

What does the reader think of this conduct of Hecker? Is it commendable to corrupt the text of a book under review?

In this passage I say plainly: "*no doctor, as far as I know, has sought to ascertain the curative tendencies of medicines from their effects on the healthy body*," and this is perfectly true. But I never said, "physicians have never recorded any effects of medicines."† This they have cer-

* *Quid enim medicamina per se efficiant, ed est, quid in sano corpore mutant, perscrutari, ut inde pateat, quibus in universum morbis conveniant, nemo hucdum medicorum, quantum scio curavit.*

† According to Hecker they did *concern* themselves with "the effects

tainly done and I have reproduced their observations as completely as possible in the *Fragmenta*, but they did this either unintentionally, and their records were only apropos of something else (*quasi aliud agendo*), or they had merely what is called "toxicology" in their mind, and imagined that in the phenomena they observed they only displayed the *absolute hurtfulness* of these medicinal substances, or exhibited these ghastly pictures of observations in order to show how skilfully they cured such poisonings, or how impossible it was to save the poisoned patients. They never represent these symptoms as effects of the medicines that might be utilized for remedial purposes, as eradicators of disease, or as capable of being used for the cure of diseases. These physicians never gave such substances purposely to healthy persons in order to ascertain their effects as indications for their use in the cure of disease. No physician, before me, ever tested the medicines on the healthy human body with the view of searching for and discovering their true, pure, positive curative powers in their morbid effects. This is what I stated in that passage of the preface to the *Fragmenta*. Who is there who can deny its truth?

At p. 43, Hecker wonders why I give the peculiar effects of medicinal substances without mentioning the dose in which each was given. Just as if quality could

of medicines on the healthy." But this I deny, they did not concern themselves at all, and made no trials of medicines on the healthy, not even for the purpose of giving a mere historical account of them ; if we except W. Alexander alone, who regarded the effects of camphor and saltpetre merely as noxious.

be altered by quantity, just as if the faculty of a medicinal substance to act dynamically or spiritually could be changed by mere aggregation or subdivision !

The dose in experiments of this sort may be very various, and this was so in my trials ; and yet the resulting effects were the same in kind and even in degree, according as the constitutions of the subjects were more or less excitable and susceptible to the medicine. To fix the dose in each case beforehand would have been a useless procedure. But that the doses in trials of this sort must not be too small, and how large they must be as a rule, this is plainly enough said in the *Organon* (§ 103*) which Hecker alleges he has read.

Sitting in his study he delivers himself theoretically thus (p. 44): "The phenomena and effects we observe after the ingestion of medicines do not depend solely on their action, but also on the various conditions of each individual, such as age, sex, mode of living, habits, temperaments, weather, and especially on the degree and nature of his health or disease, on the strength, duration or other mode of employing the medicinal substance, and, above all, on the influences bearing on the diseased organism." What a lot of absurd contradictions are contained in these few lines we shall presently see.

Hecker continues: "Owing to the infinite variety of

* [This paragraph directs that the proper dose to be taken in the proving of medicines is what is usually given in ordinary medicine in diseases. He repeats this paragraph in the three following editions ; but in the fifth edition he recommends (§128) as best for proving purposes globules of the 30th dilution.]

these numerous conditions, notwithstanding identity of action, the effects of each medicine employed may be extremely various, often, indeed, opposite.”

So the effects of the medicines administered are undecided and dissimilar, of those medicinal forces which are indescribably superior in strength to the influences of all non-medicinal external agents in human life, *even to diseases themselves!* and this is produced by the ordinary conditions of life! These are what in every case maintain human beings in such an undecided wavering condition of health that medicines are unable to produce in them any fixed positive effects! What a clever idea! How can a single human being on God's earth remain in good health if the perturbing influence of the numerous conditions in ordinary life are as enormous as the ingenious* Dr. Hecker here represents them? For, if the healthy body is so continuously, so powerfully, so inevitably deranged by all the ordinary external things around us, as Hecker piteously asserts, then the healthy body can never be healthy but always deplorably ill—a true *contradictio in adjecto*. It is well for us that the healthfulness of human beings is not influenced by this scholastic demonstration, but that people are wont to

* His excellent intentions are conspicuous; he would like that the subjects chosen for the trials of medicine should be such as could be affected in their health by every little variety of external things, should be sick persons, in fact, so that the trials might be of doubtful character. Excellent man! The pity of it is that his whole demonstration is futile, and he is caught in his own trap.

remain as a rule in good health* under the multifarious conditions of modes of living, of age, of sex, of habits, of temperaments, of weather, in spite of Court-counsellor Hecker. These healthy persons who continue to be healthy amid all the conditions and external things just alluded to will, forsooth, just on account of these influences † which are as a rule harmless to them, display

* Man has so much innate health-sustaining vital principle that the exciting causes of disease mentioned in the *Organon* (§ 59 note [v. my last translation, the 5th edition, app. p. 265]) can only make him ill when they act on him in an extreme manner, *i.e.*, for a long time, in great strength, or in large numbers. But as the organism cannot be induced to become diseased by the ordinary influences to which it is exposed in daily life, it follows undeniably that the action on the body of medicines which have a much greater power over the state of health of human beings than diseases, as they are able to overcome the latter must also be infinitely freer from all influences of the ordinary daily conditions of life, consequently all effects of medicines on the healthy body must be extremely constant, determinable and reliable. Who can deny this?

† Among these influences which are supposed to have made my experiments uncertain, and to which I am supposed to pay no attention (p. 45), Hecker includes *diseases*, and yet he must have read in the preface that the provings in the *Fragmenta* were made on persons in the best possible *health*. This insinuation of Hecker's is, therefore, a pure invention. For, in the inconsiderable number of symptoms observed by me in the trials purposely made by me on persons affected with some external malady, this circumstance has always been expressly mentioned. Just imagine! Healthy persons, and yet, according to Hecker, influenced by disease! Such contradictions could only occur in Hecker's *insanabile caput*. But perhaps Hecker is acquainted with diseases of a peculiar kind, not cognizable

nothing but variable, undecided dissimilar effects from every medicinal substance they take! What does the reader say to this contradiction?

In this instance Hecker's *pruritis contradicendi* drives him to make assertions, as every sensible person must see, from which, without his knowledge and will, it is demonstrated "*that medicines can have no positive effects whatever.*" If, then, medicines cannot possibly have any positive, reliable effects, *even on healthy persons*, but only variable, diverse and even opposite effects, does not the wisdom of Doctor and Professor Hecker perceive how undecided and unreliable must be the effects of medicines *in diseases* whose number and whose perturbing effects on the body are so enormously large? In diseases which, unlike the multifarious influences of daily life that leave the person well, are, on the contrary, wont to make him ill, as our Court-counsellor knows.

If medicines are universally addicted to show nothing but undecided, always diverse, unreliable effects on human beings, even healthy ones, then it must be impossible to trust to the effects of medicines in diseases!

Patients besides being exposed to most of the external influences Hecker thinks so much of, to which the healthy also are subject, are, according to him, liable to many more alterations than the healthy. Consequently the

by any external signs nor perceptible by the individual himself or by those about him by any symptom, nor presenting anything manifest to the senses, and which leave the man well in all respects. No one knows what contradictory things can be dreamed of by *a-priori* seers!

effects of medicines on patients must naturally be much less precise and reliable, indeed so undeterminable, so unreliable and perverse, that it were impossible to imagine an intentional cure of diseases by medicines! So farewell to the whole lot of books on materia medica, goodbye to the numerous treatises on therapeutics and practical medicine of all sorts which have hitherto been founded on the reliability of the effects of medicines!

What use is there now for professors of therapeutics and clinical medicine? For there is no longer a possibility of an art of medicine!

Bent on confuting me, Hecker does not see what a blow he gives to the cracked gothic building of his patched-up medical system by this lovely demonstration of his, by which he only meant to show up the fallacy of the observations of medicinal symptoms in my *Fragmenta*!

Capital! By insisting on the deceitful character of all medicinal effects on the healthy and diseased body, Hecker clearly demonstrates the impossibility of any medical art and reduces the medical profession to utter nullity. Does Hecker think to escape this dilemma, by taking for granted (pp. 44, 45), an internal action of medicines that always remains the same notwithstanding all varieties of outward effects? This will not help him, as he cannot see that hypothetical internal action. No one can have any knowledge of the action of medicines on the human body except what the consequences of their employment, that is to say, the symptoms observed from them reveal. This is what I have termed the action-tendency of the medicines, which constantly strives to mani-

fest itself in the human body, but which cannot reveal itself in trials on the healthy otherwise than by phenomena cognizable by the senses. In this case these express (if all strong, noxious influences from without are avoided) the true action of the medicine on the organism so purely and clearly that these effects may be unhesitatingly called the pure actions of the medicines; and a collection of such pure effects constitutes the sum of the action-tendency of the medicinal substance administered as perfectly as is required by mortals for enabling them to cure diseases. Such a collection of the pure effects of medicines is the external revelation of the action-tendency of a medicinal substance.

But not every healthy person can at one and the same time undergo all the morbid states which the medicine tends to produce,* because the power of life to maintain health strives, as a rule, to prevent this, and thus it is that moderate doses of medicine allow the manifestation of one set of morbid states in one person, another in another, according to the susceptibility of each.

But the conditions under which this or that symptom of this or that medicine is wont to appear by preference, the ordinary circumstances of life—age, sex, ordinary weather, evening, morning, night, open air, falling asleep, sleeping, waking, eating, drinking, lying, standing, etc., are so harmless and so incapable of altering the original

* Which are always brought into operation in the homœopathic employment in diseases by the rapid cure of all the symptoms of its sphere of action.

medicinal symptoms in healthy persons, that they may be regarded merely as external *conditions* appertaining to the production of the symptoms, but the phenomena thus observed are in complete accord with the true action of the medicine, seeing that a more accurate knowledge of the latter is not conceivable and is not attainable by man.

From these facts it is an *infallible, manifest truth that medicines develop positive, invariable actions and effects in the healthy human body.*

This is also seen in the medicinal symptoms observed by other physicians in the *Fragmenta*. There it is remarkable how many of the effects of the same medicine in various observers correspond, though none of them knew what had taken place in the others, in a word how every medicine produces identical effects in ordinarily healthy persons!

The articles on *belladonna*, *hyoscyamus* and *stramonium* may serve as examples.

Hecker can no more argue away these observations than he can mine. He asserts further (p. 45): "Hahnemann has observed from *chamomilla* the most wonderful symptoms, resembling those of the most powerful poisonous plants, but other physicians have seen nothing of the sort." It is a melancholy fact that Hecker and his colleagues know next to nothing of the effects of this powerful plant, in fact they *could not* observe any, as they only employed it casually as a domestic medicine in the form of a tea or clyster *in between their administration of many other drugs mingled together in complex prescriptions*, so that they could not see its characteristic effects. Thus its pe-

cular effects were generally hindered and destroyed by the antidotal action of the many other drugs administered at the same time. They *would not* take notice of anything relating to *chamomilla*, because they regarded it as an unimportant thing, a mere accessory, a domestic remedy unworthy the attention of learned professors of medicine. This was the charming way they have hitherto taken in order to arrive at truth!

But in order to say something against me, Hecker goes beyond his previous assertions and transgresses the canons of honest controversy: "In the *Fragmenta*," he says, "symptoms like those of the most powerful vegetable poisons are ascribed to *chamomilla*."

But the most powerful so-called vegetable poisons kill in large doses. Have I ever said that of *chamomilla*? His exaggerations thus become untruths!

"The symptoms Hahnemann has given of the medicines under observation," according to Hecker, "vary in unimportant particulars, are often contradictory and contrary to one another—cold, heat, loss of sensibility, pains, etc." Does he then not approve of medicines causing first cold, afterwards heat, of others causing mingled heat and cold, others loss of sensibility followed by particular kinds of pain, etc., then all he has to do as Court-counsellor and Professor is to command that henceforth medicinal substances should not presume to act thus, and doubtless they will obey him. And whereas the exciting causes of intermittent fevers have hitherto presumed to cause *such contradictory and opposite* phenomena as cold and heat, insensibility and pains, are, Dr. Hecker will not

have them acting in this manner—and so they must henceforth cease to do so.

Hecker complains (p. 46) that “*chamomilla* and *belladonna*, according to the *Fragmenta*, have produced almost all the symptoms known to pathology.” What a poverty of symptoms must pathology be afflicted with, if they are all contained in the symptoms of *chamomilla* and *belladonna*! Who can fail to perceive the exaggeration and untruth of this assertion? And how can he represent the works on pathology as containing all the morbid symptoms occurring in nature? Pathological treatises are human handiwork, but infinite nature makes diseases without asking pathologists of what symptoms they shall be composed.

He says further: “It must strike one as strange that physicians have noticed few or none of the effects Hahnemann has recorded of the commonest medicines which are in daily use, and which have become ordinary domestic medicines, such as *camphor* and *chamomilla*.” Who can fail to perceive that people have become so habituated to these medicinal substances by their daily use as ordinary domestic remedies, that they are almost incapable of exciting any striking effects? Must that appear strange to any man whose business it ought to be to reflect? It is something quite different that strikes me as strange, namely, how is it possible that Hecker and his like can, while they are giving complex mixtures of other medicines, allow such manifestly medicinal substances as *camphor* and *chamomilla* to be taken indiscriminately, as though they were of no consequence (Hecker calls them contemptuously “commonest medicines”); how can they

prescribe them daily as if good for everything, and permit them to be used as universal domestic remedies, and yet call themselves rational physicians.

Whilst giving such hotch-potch mixtures of many other medicines, it is impossible to observe anything of the pure effects either of *coffee* or of *chamomilla* or of *camphor*. By so doing, these very learned gentlemen do not see the wood for the trees. Is that wonderful? We cannot actually say that God has afflicted them with blindness; they obscure their own vision with their coarse routine employment of complex mixtures.

Let any one read in the *Fragmenta* what dangerous, violent symptoms those most trustworthy men, Friedrich Hoffmann, Cullen and W. Alexander observed from *camphor* given by itself, and what Ortel says about it in his *Med. pr. Beob.*, and he will wonder how Hecker can assert that "physicians have known few or none of the effects of *camphor* which Hahnemann has recorded." By suppressing what is good and true in this manner, and by mendaciously offering to the public enough of what is bad, it is possible to represent white as black, and to spread abroad such an intentional confusion of ideas, such obscurity, that no reader can know how to distinguish truth from falsehood and deception. It is in this glorious way that Hecker poses as a benefactor of the world!

Similar exaggerations and falsehoods occur further on (pp. 46, 47). "Hahnemann," he says, "lets *chamomilla* do horrible things, severe rigor, blindness" (*in the Fragmenta* it stands "along with chilliness, dimness of sight"); "insanity" (the *Fragmenta* has only symptoms expressing dizziness, distraction, and some deceptions of the senses);

“convulsions and somnolence” (the *Fragmenta* has this symptom: “In the morning a fever attended by sopor, and some twitching in the limbs”). How any honorable man can indulge in such exaggerations I am at a loss to understand.

Hecker continues: “Many of the symptoms could not possibly have occurred; of several medicines it is said that they cause rheumatic or arthritic pains, but rheumatism and arthritis are definite, peculiar forms of disease, which certainly cannot be caused by any medicine in the world.” Verily, very learned, as if spoken *ex cathedra*! But who ever said that the provers had the ordinary rheumatism of the nosological works, or common gout, or even, that they had anything of the sort? They only likened the pains they felt to the rheumatic and gouty kinds of pain; it would not have been right for the author to substitute other words than those they used to express their sensations. Here, then, we have another Heckerian perversion.

So it is, also, with the symptoms described by Hecker as “scrupulous” (or, as he elsewhere calls them “micrological”). Thus, he says, he has counted above a hundred different pains in the proving of *chamomilla*, and gets very angry about it.* This is a palpable falsehood, for *chamomilla* has but few peculiar pains; but they occur in various parts of the body and under certain specified conditions. If any one will look into the *Fragmenta*, he will be able to appreciate Hecker’s love of truth! He

* Because he feels that all his life he has been misusing it in an empirical way, just as the old wives do.

says, that I assert that "*chamomilla* causes the lower lip to split down through the middle." The expression is, "*labii inferioris medium rhagade fissum*," which may be translated "the lower lip gets a crack in the middle." Admire the beauty and faithfulness of Court-counsellor Hecker's translation!

A symptom of *cinchona*: "*obturatio auris interna*," referring to a kind of dullness of hearing, as though something lay upon the ear internally, is thus given by Hecker (p. 38): "*Cinchona* bark produces in the very first hour an internal stopping up of the ear." God knows what sort of a cork or plug he was thinking of!

He says further on (p. 48): "*Valerian* is credited with having caused a *synochus* in healthy persons, which, however, is palpably false, for *synochus*, as is well known, is a *definite* (?) form of disease of peculiar character, and as this medicine is so frequently employed, a *valerian* *synochus* must surely have been observed by some other medical men."

Very learnedly spoken from the symbolical books of the *ars conjecturalis*, out of which there is no salvation! So then, dear nature must not any longer develop in the children of man an enormous number of *different* acute fevers; Hecker and his set won't have it; they have only described in their works one single *synochus* with peculiar, unalterable characteristics! Every one describes a different one,* and infinite nature has to be guided accordingly!

* Every nosologist has only one single *synochus*, but each perceives and describes a different one according to the peculiarity of his mind.

It has often been remarked, and with much truth, that the failure of Hecker and his like to see a thing is no proof that the thing does not exist. Who among them has ever given *valerian* by itself for a disease without prescribing several other medicines a short time before, a short time afterwards, or at the same time? Who among them has ever given *valerian* experimentally to healthy persons? What pure effects of it can these gentlemen have observed? Of course, none at all. What title then have they to contradict facts which they have never had an opportunity of observing?

Hecker continues: "Most of the medicines here treated of produce in the provers states of unconsciousness, somnolence, delirium and so forth" (not true!), "and so it is incomprehensible how they could give such precise micrological descriptions of their sensations." Is it stated in the *Fragmenta* that the unconscious, the somnolent, the delirious, observed and recorded their own condition and those other symptoms which followed or preceded those states? What absurdity!

No one could believe how deficient in honesty Hecker is; how well he understands how to distort the most obvious facts, to turn white into black, and to throw dust into the reader's eyes, if one did not read all this in his own words.

But now comes (pp. 48, 49) the best bit of all out of the innermost depths of his heart. His words are: "Hahnemann has made the most and the most exact experiments on his own person. . . . The body and mind of a man who has instituted those trials on himself must *infallibly*

be soon *disordered* to such a degree that he can no longer be regarded as a *healthy person*, and his capacity for making accurate and unprejudiced observations must be seriously impaired, *often completely lost.*"

Insinuations of this sort are undeserving of notice. The reader will therefore excuse me from saying anything more about them. Every man endowed with proper feeling will appreciate their malice and will feel a pitying contempt for a man who could demean himself by such base conduct.

In connection with the above, Hecker quotes the worst symptoms in the whole of the *Fragmenta*, and *pretends* that I produced them on myself! "With amazement," he says, "one reads here the description of the frightful sufferings, the anxiety, the pains, the sad hypochondriacal dispositions, the mental imbecilities, the delusions, the furious deliria, the comas, the convulsions and many other sufferings endured by Hahnemann in his own person." The reader of the *Fragmenta* will be astonished to find that *neither in that work nor anywhere else do I say that these horrible things occurred to me.* And, moreover, the worst of the symptoms detailed by Hecker, the *furious deliria*, are taken by him from the observations of others, from a certain Kramer (*Frag.*, p. 249) and a certain Hoyer (*Frag.*, p. 34), and ascribed to me. I never included in the *Fragmenta* "furious deliria" among the symptoms observed by me! Far less that I was affected in that way. I leave the reader to qualify as it deserves such a perversion of the truth.

In no part of the *Fragmenta* have I given the names of

the persons on whom I made the trials. The most severe symptoms were observed in persons who by accident or from ignorance had swallowed too large a quantity of the medicine, and who were excitable and sensitive. Those taken from the records of the symptoms observed by other physicians were generally much more violent than those observed by myself. I never subjected myself or others to such dangerous consequences of large doses of medicine. Those who know me are well aware that I am incapable of doing such a thing, and that I can only feel contempt for such calumnious statements. To be abused by such an one as Hecker, is the greatest compliment he could pay me. How could any person of intelligence assert that those observations in the *Fragmenta*, which were conducted with the most obvious care and circumstantiality, which demanded the most acute judgment and the most circumspect and watchful mind, were observed and recorded by a person suffering from coma or affected with furious delirium?

Surely this is enough to show the intelligent, impartial reader that Hecker's judgment was perverted by passionate prejudice.

Towards the end of p. 49, he insists "that Hahnemann should have defined the kind of health enjoyed by those (healthy persons) on whom the trials were made, and have mentioned all the various degrees of health they presented at every trial;" and he goes on making similar impossible and ridiculous propositions which, though they are unnecessary and absurd, are so easy to make on paper.

As no created being can penetrate into the interior of men or things, so we can only ascertain what health is by the teachings of experience—more we cannot ascertain. I was guided by sound reason and common sense in selecting healthy subjects, and I chose those who would be generally considered healthy for my experiments respecting the action of medicines, and in this way I did all that it was in the power of man to do. For this there was no need of scholastic divisions and subdivisions, which the sensible reader will willingly leave to dogmatic writers of books, who, as a rule, labor under a lack of sound common sense.

Moreover the very great “susceptibility of human beings to the action of medicine” (which Hecker at p. 50 assigns as a reason for denying the constant character of medicinal symptoms) can, in such trials, reveal nothing but what lies in the nature of the action of the medicinal substance; it can alter nothing in the essential quality of the medicine; it can only cause the phenomena to be more striking, more distinct and stronger.

Where I have described the effects of a medicine on a person affected with an external malady, which was very rarely the case, I was careful, as I have already said, to mention this circumstance *on every occasion*; all the other phenomena were observed on subjects as healthy as possible, and, as is stated in the *Organon* (§§ 103, 104, 105 [5th edit., §§ 121, 125, 126]), under external conditions as similar as possible.

In order to say something disparaging about such trials of medicines on healthy persons, which, however, is neither

appropriate nor to the point, Hecker adds (p. 50): "If we take a number of healthy persons and give them coffee, wine, brandy, etc., which belong to the most ordinary articles of diet" (does not Hecker know that the effects of those things we partake of daily must be most indistinct and unnoticeable, as the action of what we have taken a short time before is not over when a new portion of it is swallowed, and that the daily and continued habit of using it, obliterates all striking effects? Who gave him the sage advice to offer the impure and indistinct results of habitual articles of diet as a test and refutation of my pure trials with unaccustomed medicines?), "in various quantities and strength and under various internal and external conditions" (this is just the exact opposite of the conditions under which I conducted my trials, they were made and taught to be made *under regulated external conditions as nearly as possible identical*; the search after *internal* invisible conditions in healthy subjects for such trials I leave to superfine geniuses), "what a great variety of effects would be produced!" This is a supposition and a conjecture evolved at the desk; Hecker has never put to the proof or made trials of anything of the sort, his mind is saturated with book-scribbling and verbosity. And would it be wonderful or would it prove anything against my trials if a great variety of effects had been produced, seeing that Hecker would have these substances administered "under *very dissimilar internal and external conditions*"—which is just what I deprecated? Who asked him to do this? He only wished to cause confusion by making a totally inappropriate comparison in order to damage my experiments.

“How much greater,” continues Hecker, “must the difficulties be of obtaining reliable results, when unaccustomed powerful drugs are administered to persons of various peculiarities of constitution under multifarious external conditions?”

How would it be if they were administered in circumstances as nearly identical as possible, as directed in the *Organon* (§§ 102–105 [5th edit., §§ 124–127]), and as was done by me? Were these remarks devised by Hecker with any other object than to divert the attention of the reader from the true point of view?

And how directly at variance with experience* is this statement: “that unaccustomed drugs are less capable of developing distinct, striking and precise effects than such as are taken daily and habitually!” The exact contrary is the case! A person who drinks coffee for the first time will, as every sensible man knows, manifest more distinct, striking and precise symptoms than one almost constantly swilling coffee, and thus gradually becoming habituated to it! How utterly unfounded his assertion! The exact contrary of what he excogitates and hatches in his study takes place in nature!†

At p. 51 and in many other places of his diatribe he

* Experience and scribbling are two very different things! Works of experience, such as my *Fragmenta* and *Organon of Rational Medicine* can only, if at all, be confirmed or refuted by fresh, honest experiments. It is ridiculous, and more than ridiculous, to combat careful real experience by tirades *ex cathedra* and captious verbosity.

† “They become owls, which see only in the darkness of their dreams, but become blind in the light of experience, and are unable to perceive that which is brightest.”—BACON.

makes it a crime that I have given a full and accurate description of the symptoms; sneers continually at it, and calls it "anxious micrology and scrupulosity, which without being of the slightest advantage" (as he understands the word), "only confuses the subject and often runs off into ridiculous trifles."

If this trick should succeed in sneering away all the symptoms given in full detail and with all their special peculiarities, he would certainly have given the good cause a severe blow. For were he able to take away all those symptoms so carefully and truthfully observed, so significant and so characteristic of the special tendency of each individual medicine, there would remain nothing but the symptoms of little or no significance only indicated by single words, such as: Heat, cold, restless sleep, somnolence, anorexia, discomfort, etc., which I allowed to stand provisionally in the hope of being able to characterize them more exactly in the case of each medicine, but without attaching any value to them (*vide Organon of Rational Medicine* § 129 [5th edit., § 153]), seeing that they are, as I have said, only vague and indefinite. It would be much more convenient for Hecker and his associates to know only such vague medicinal symptoms expressed by single words, and hardly even so much, as they do not care to know anything about the cases of disease they have to treat than just such vague generalities, in order that they may get quickly through their work; what is still wanting to force the pace, to wit, to give the cases pathological names, that Hecker and company can speedily evolve out of their own heads, so as to enable them to finish their business in a minute or two.

It was not thus that old Father Hippocrates went to work; in his incomparable histories of cases of epidemic diseases,* he records with the most minute detail almost only special, often very special, symptoms of the disease he observed. In this, as he felt, lay the peculiar, the distinctive features of each case of disease.

But the ever-ready prescription writers of the Heckerian stamp know a vast deal better than the wise Hippocrates (whose name is constantly in their mouths, whilst in their acts they dishonor and deny him!); all they need to do is to ask the patient a couple of questions and feel his pulse gracefully, in order to be able at once to prescribe a lot of medicines mixed together, of whose special action they know *nothing* definite, and do not care to know anything true or definite. What a contrast does this superficial, bungling practice present to the careful, true, detailed observations of Hippocrates which Hecker must scoff at as anxiously micrological, over-scrupulous and ridiculous trifling, seeing that he finds fault with me for recording the medicinal symptoms with similar minuteness. If nature presents the symptoms of diseases with such circumstantiality as Hippocrates testifies by his records of cases of disease, it would be wrong to overlook the special symptoms of medicines corresponding to those of diseases, as these must be investigated in the homœopathic treatment.

The minute, special symptoms of each individual medicinal substance, by which it is characterized and

* Let any one read the 42 histories of cases of disease in the 1st and 2d books of *The Epidemics*.

differentiated from other medicines, are observable just because they must be observed, and precisely because they are as useful and necessary to enable us to effect a definite, certain and rapid cure, as is a detailed knowledge of the disease symptoms in each individual case.

With equal minuteness and scrupulosity, observations in objects of natural history are conducted; *e.g.*, in the description of every single species of plants, and yet they are of no, or of comparatively little, use to humanity. Every joint of the antennæ of the rarest and most useless insects is described and counted; the tiniest worms are dissected and the peculiarities of their intestines noted; minerals are scrupulously described in all their infinite varieties of composition down to the minutest deviations and in all their properties cognizable by the senses. And quite right, too! the properties and varieties of natural bodies and natural phenomena, enormously numerous though they be, exist in order that we may observe them.

And in the matter that is of the greatest importance to humanity, in the observation of every case of disease we have to treat, and in the search for the observable effects of every medicine we have to employ as our remedial instrument, in this alone shall the most unpardonable negligence and superficiality be commendable? Does that deserve the name of rational medicine, of wisdom, of love of truth, of conscientiousness? *It is just the opposite.*

At p. 52 Hecker does not seem to know what he wants, so involved he becomes in in consequence and untruth-

fulness. He asks: "What are the effects of medicines to be used against the symptoms of disease? What, among so many others, are the phenomena in disease which we are to oppose by remedies that cause similar phenomena?" "These two main questions Hahnemann has not satisfactorily answered in his book, but, on the contrary, has increased the difficulty of answering them."

As regards the first question, it is answered, as well as was possible for a single honest observer, in the *Fragmenta*, which records the effects of a number of simple medicines tested on the healthy body. Having just criticized this book (the *Fragmenta*), which contains these medicinal symptoms, Hecker now asks about the effects and symptoms of medicines that are to be opposed to the symptoms of disease. What answer should be given him? Has he failed to understand that, according to the *homœopathic* doctrine, the medicines causing the *most similar possible* symptoms are to be employed against the symptoms of disease? Will he now understand?

The second main question (which is purely clinical and therapeutical): "To what symptoms of disease are we to adapt the medicinal symptoms?" Hecker addresses to the *Fragmenta*, which only contains materia medica, and consequently is naturally not calculated to answer questions of a clinical kind—an odd blunder for a professor to make. Or is it, perhaps, merely a piece of chicanery on his part? He himself gives the answer to this question, a few pages farther on (p. 58), from my *Medicine of Experience*, and still more explicitly is it given in the *Organon* (§§ 129, 130 [5th Edit., §§ 154, 155]). But

here, at p. 52, he pretends that he knows nothing about it, and that the question was never answered by me. He has either got some one to transcribe the passages from the *Medicine of Experience* and *Organon*, without having read the works himself, or he tries to throw dust in the readers' eyes—a proceeding that is both dishonorable and calumnious. There is no third explanation.

What follows: "The medicines" down to "identical effects," I have already several times refuted. It is a common trick of Hecker's to give frequent réchauffés of his fictitious accusations, so that it may appear as though his objections were *numerous* and that they were *all new*.

But a passage at p. 52 is too palpably untrue to be left unnoticed. He asserts: "What Hahnemann observed from *aconite*, *hyoscyamus*, *nux vomica*, *stramonium* and so on is identical" (I would specially direct attention to *identical*) "with what he saw from *arnica*, *camphor*, *chamomilla*, *cinchona* and others; so that there is a wonderful correspondence among the different articles." He must imagine that none of his readers has the *Fragmenta* before him, and that of those who have, none understand Latin; otherwise, he would not so confidently utter such a palpable falsehood, to wit, that the symptoms of all these medicines are almost identical. On the previous page (p. 51) he finds fault with the too special and micrological difference of the symptoms of the several medicines (which implies the greatest variety), and here, on the very next page, he asserts that they are all the same; that nine medicines have identical symptoms. What is one to think of such conduct? But immediately after-

wards his reason for devising this figment becomes manifest: "Almost all the 27 medicines," he says, "whose effects Hahnemann has described caused pains, spasms, chill, etc. Would it be a matter of indifference which we gave when the patients complained of pains, spasms, chill, etc?" Here he would make the reader believe that the symptoms of the medicines in the *Fragmenta* consisted of single vague words like chill, pain and so forth, that I would make use of these vague, indefinite, single-word morbid symptoms—chill, pain, etc.—for the treatment; and yet Heckèr, as regards the first, shortly before complained of the exact opposite, namely, the excessive speciality and micrology of the symptoms in the *Fragmenta*; and, as regards the second, he himself quoted literally the exact opposite (pp. 58 and 65) from my *Medicine of Experience*.*

And how distinctly and carefully is this subject explained in the *Organon* (§§ 129, 130 [5th Edit., §§ 153, 154])!

All this he purposely withholds in order to deceive the public. To do this he makes use of expressions (p. 55) which are as confused as they are unjust, disgraceful and revolting: "The patients complain of many and various things; which of all these are we first to seize upon in order to give a medicine for them?" And further on: "Which symptom and which medicine are we to attend to

* Namely, that in the treatment of every disease, whenever possible, the whole group of disease-symptoms must be covered by a group of symptoms of the medicine selected as similar as possible and, above all, of a special character.

in order to carry out a plan of treatment?" And again: "Anything we may *arbitrarily select* will, according to Hahnemann's assertions, be always right and in accordance with his principle, if among the list of effects a medicine produces in the healthy state, we should find *only one symptom*" (the reader should observe Hecker says emphatically "*only one symptom*") "that is similar to any one symptom of the disease we wish to cure."

It is impossible to imagine more shameless accusations and calumnies than these of Hecker! He himself (at p. 65) quotes from the *Medicine of Experience* the passage that convicts him of falsehood: "The cure must be effected by the employment of a medicine which is capable of causing as fully as possible all the symptoms the disease presents, or at least the *largest number* and the most intense, or at least the most peculiar, and in the same order." These words Hecker quotes (p. 65) from the *Medicine of Experience*,* and is not ashamed to falsely accuse me of

* He had the *Organon* also before him, as he calls his article a *review* of the *Organon*. In this *Organon*, among other things, are the following words which convict him of mendacity (§ 129 [5th Edit., § 153]): "In this search for a homœopathic specific remedy, that is to say, in this comparison of the collective symptoms of the natural disease with the list of symptoms of known medicines, in order to find among them an artificial morbid agent corresponding by similarity to the disease to be cured, the more *striking, singular, characteristic* signs of the former are chiefly to be kept in view; for it is more particularly these that *very similar* ones in the list of symptoms of the remedy sought for must correspond to, in order to constitute it the most suitable for effecting the cure. The *more general symptoms*, anorexia, weakness, discomfort, disturbed sleep, etc., demand much less attention when

teaching the exact contrary (p. 53), as though I were like himself and his school, who, after hearing two or three, or even one word from the patient, are quite ready to write a prescription suggested *by their own caprice*.

Wait a little! The victory of my doctrine will soon, God willing, put a stop to the pernicious work of Hecker and Company, with their arbitrary manufacture of complex prescriptions, which is such an easy task for them! To impose on the public knowingly, especially in a matter so essential to the welfare of humanity, is worse than high treason.

All the complicated array of questions Hecker launches at p. 53 are distinctly and completely answered in the *Organon of Rational Medicine*. But in this place, in order to throw dust in the reader's eyes, he tries to make believe that I have never answered them. What does the honor-loving reader think of that?

He next (p. 54) cites long passages from the *Medicine of Experience*, published six years ago, and, when the subject is the sure and rapid cure by the homœopathic method, he exclaims: "Pneumonia, typhus, intermittent fever are immediately cured without going through their accus-

of that general character, and when they cannot be more particularly described." Further, § 130 [5th Edit., § 154]: "If the antitype constructed from the list of symptoms of the most suitable medicine contain those characteristic symptoms which are to be met with in the disease to be cured, *in the greatest number and in the greatest similarity*, this medicine is the most appropriate, the specific remedy for this morbid state." And just the opposite of this Hecker falsely palms off on the unsuspecting public. *Hic niger est, hunc tu Germane caveto!*

tomed course and their crises." Certainly, when the treatment is conducted in the way I direct! But a man who, *without putting to the test of experience* the thing he finds fault with, consults only his own prejudices and the blind guidance of his *ars conjecturalis*, cannot believe this, because he has *never* seen such cures effected; he *will* not believe because he has resolved not to give up his routine treatment and his old leaven, nor allow himself to be convinced or convince himself. Had he honestly and unprejudicedly treated diseases according to my method or witnessed such treatment, and had he not resolved of set purpose to shut his eyes to the result, he would speak quite differently; but he endeavors, by means of arbitrary additions, omissions and detractions to upset the firmly grounded truth, and thus seeks to hinder the acceptance of the good. But the truth cannot be suppressed by such miserable logomachies; it is firmly fixed, and eternal, like the Godhead itself.

Go on treating diseases in your contradictory, empirical, routine way, to the accompaniment of magniloquent *a-priori* phrases from your therapeutic manuals! We do not grudge you the pleasure of seeing the many varieties of typhus, synochus, and synocha and other artificially constructed kinds of diseases run their course just as they please under your treatment, and linger on through convalescence for another quarter of a year and longer, suffering all the time from pains and aches caused by your elegant complex prescriptions; but allow me to pity your patients suffering from acute diseases who may be subjected to your treatment, and those affected by chronic

maladies who may be made worse and brought down to the depths of despair by the pernicious practices of your blind empiricism. In intermittent fevers you are heartily welcome to the perspirations and red sediment in the urine (p. 55) you deem essential as the precursors of your so-called cure. We do not envy you these things; homoeopathy needs them not.

At p. 57 Hecker defends the plan of giving diseases particular names. But he confounds the application of names for the general with the employment of names for the individual denomination of diseases. The latter only is improper, as it creates a mischievous confusion. I may very well say: "In this month acute pleurisy was rife." This as a general observation; but, of a particular patient, I cannot say: "He has the pleurisy," because there is not one single kind only of this affection. These and other dissimilar diseases differ vastly from one another; all that we can say of such a patient is that he has a pleuritic disease or a kind of pleurisy. All these innumerably different kinds, all cases of disease must be examined individually and treated medically individually, often very differently, each according to its peculiarities. They cannot therefore have the common name of "the pleurisy;" this would only lead to one general mode of treatment, and that is what these fixed names have hitherto done.

This has all been distinctly set forth in the *Organon* and any one who does not understand it, either will not understand it, or has not read the works he criticizes, or is too stupid to understand them.

"The careful investigation and accurate differentiation

of the symptoms," about which Hecker is, further on, so angry (sneering at them as "microscopical," and "anxious") and about which he was previously so often out of temper, is certainly not convenient for those superficial, easy-going practitioners whose sole object is to make the greatest number of professional visits in the shortest time, and not to do the most good to their patients.

Accordingly, he complains (p. 59): "Pity 'tis, that for such a long art" (the homœopathic system) "the days are too short!" "What Hahnemann here enjoins is such an arduous and tedious business" (what a philanthropic remark!) "that a practitioner only moderately busy could not find time for it."

Indeed! How unused our Hecker must be to the performance of good deeds, that he considers the treatment of his fellow-creatures in the manner most conducive to their cure as such an arduous and tedious business! The ordinary man would find a noisy tippling party, a lewd conversation, an intrigue, or the gaming table, much less tedious than the art of saving men's lives, from which the saviour often gains nothing but heavenly peace of mind, a sensation unknown to the physician who suffers from hardness of heart.

For the writing of egotistical articles of no earthly value Hecker has lots of time, but to devote half an hour to a patient, and by doing so to procure for him the greatest of blessings, health, he has no time, for this *the days are all too short?*

It is precisely in the ordinary routine treatment, which looks so rapid because it makes men's and horses' feet

move so quickly, that so much precious time is wasted. Every case requires a number of days or weeks, even if only one short visit or perhaps several are paid every day; whereas, a similar disease, if treated according to my method, needs in general not a fifth, often not a tenth of that length of attendance, although the practitioner does not walk, ride, or drive at such a furious pace. Hence *a much greater number* of patients can be treated in a year by my method, as each requires the services of his medical attendant for such a short time.

Now (pp. 59, 60) Hecker begins to maunder at great length over the maxim: "That in the investigation of every case of disease we ought to take note of the most constant, the most striking, the most singular, uncommon symptoms, which furnish the characteristic, the distinguishing, the individual features of the case of disease," and he attempts to combat this with the dogmatic assertions of the symbolic books of the *ars conjecturalis*, which are constantly changing. But as the symbolic books of the *ars conjecturalis* are of no value, and on account of their endless contradictory assertions (every writer asserts something different without any reason) possess no authority whatever, his whole argument is futile.

At p. 62 Hecker alleges: "A much larger number of observations, as all* physicians know (?), may be adduced

* When Hecker asserts anything untenable, he usually refers to others as his authority—"others" and "all physicians" are alleged to have said it, and even to have seen it! He employs this trick *ad nauseam*. Just as though the numerous respectable and truth-loving physicians, still existing in Germany, had made themselves accom-

where two or more diseases existed alongside of one another, and neither removed the other." Why does he not produce them? Why does he not give the names of the observers? so that the reader may be able to judge whether any one of them was the equal, as to honesty and observing power, of Ontyd and John Hunter, who are on my side. Hecker can mention no *reliable* authorities who have made *pure* observations of this kind.*

At p. 63 he attempts to deny one of the facts given by me, the truth of which any one can ascertain for himself. If *words, empty words, mere denial*, could do away with facts, that would be a fine thing for Hecker, *who only deals in words*.

According to p. 64, "mercurial remedies, salt water, soap, baths, and cleanliness in general, can cure the itch (of wool-workers) as well as *sulphur*."

Strictly speaking, this is utterly false! But, if we do not consider it so strictly, but as a specimen of the loose way in which Hecker and his allies talk about diseases and their cure, we see that, by means of the remedies sub-

plices of his perversions, deceptions, sophisms, falsehoods, and calumnies! He stands alone with his henchmen! Moreover, the confirmation or refutation of true doctrines is not to be settled by majority of votes.

* That two diseases can *coexist separately* in one body, for any length of time, and thus (as a proof of their separate coexistence in the body) be separately curable; no single instance of this can be cited; this is rather what happens—when one does not remove the other, they coalesce after a short time to form a *tertium quid*, a new intermediate disease.

stituted for *sulphur* with so much levity, a more or less considerable portion of the eruption disappears from the skin (generally only for a short time); but, what will subsequently happen, and what may be the consequences to the patient's health of this purely local, one-sided, and quackish treatment, is no concern of this kind of treatment.

The rubbish he writes (p. 66): "that the treatment recommended in the *Organon* constitutes a therapeutic method of an extremely indeterminate character and devoid of all fixed rational grounds," is quite ridiculous. A therapeutic method, in perfect accord with the principles I have taught, which selects according to infallible grounds a specific remedy, accurately suited in every respect, Hecker declares to be arbitrary and empirical!

On the other hand, the medical science of Hecker and his followers, which is compounded of opposite and incompatible parts, the *doctrine* (consisting of theoretical lists of diseases and of methods* of treatment of a merely general character, in which a heap of heterogeneous diseases are included under one common name, and are directed to be treated in squadrons, all alike, with medicines to which imaginary virtues have been arbitrarily ascribed), and the *practice*, in which the scholastic doctrine cannot be made use of in the actual disease by any one, not even by the author himself (with the exception of

* *Humano capiti cervicem pictorequinam*

Jungere si velit

Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici?

some theoretical scraps of it employed for the sake of ostentation), in which, in imitation of the shepherds and old wives, they blindly physic and quack the patients by promptly and arbitrarily writing a prescription either out of their own heads, or taken from some prescription-manual which furnishes a fitting shadow to the borrowed glimmer of light afforded by some text-books of therapeutics. In this kind of practice there is much irrational *quid pro quo* in the way of making use of surrogates. This kind of medical science, so senseless, so groundless in doctrine and practice, so prejudicial to the patient, is, by Hecker, called the only genuine and rational, the real manna from heaven! What does the unprejudiced reader think of it?

Further on (p. 66) Hecker repeats his mendacious accusation: "Hahnemann teaches that only vague single symptoms like vomiting, pains, spasms, must be combated by medicines that cause vomiting, pains, spasms, etc." I teach and I do precisely the contrary, as I have already stated. It is this same routine treatment of single, general symptoms, which express nothing definite, that physicians of Hecker's stamp will have to give up when they adopt a more carefully distinguishing treatment, that investigates the special characteristics of diseases and medicines. To shift the burden of his own sins on to others' shoulders is a mean trick.

When I distinguish between the primary and secondary actions of the medicines, and show that the latter are the opposite of the former, in strict conformity with experience—though this fact was never noticed by others before

it was pointed out by me—Hecker exclaims (p. 67); “Who can fail to perceive that it is a question here of possible consequences occurring sooner or later?” Who, I may remark, can fail to perceive that Hecker’s omniscience knows nothing about the subject, does not understand it? Or is his object merely to introduce an intentional confusion of ideas?

At p. 68, Hecker, in order to set up from the ordinary practice something in rivalry with the grand, definite, prompt, sure, homœopathic therapeutics, says: “We can certainly suppress many diseases on their first appearance” (homœopathic treatment does not *suppress* them, as the ordinary practitioner does when he can, she *cures* and extinguishes them), “for instance, the typhus” (just as though there were but one single typhus of unvarying character!) “by wine, by emetics, by aspersion with cold water, and other violent, unusual” (so it is only the violent and unusual remedies, what may be called horse-medicines, that cure. Hear him! The rational and radical, splendid, Heckerian method of treatment consists of such a wretched, crude empiricism!) “impressions that produce a revolution in the organism” (which of all these different impressions and remedies is the most appropriate for each particular case, that differs from every other? Are they all the same and their effects identical? This is as like the blind empiricism of the uneducated herbalist and the advertising quack, as one egg is like another!) “the intermittent fever” (oh! indeed *the* intermittent fever; so there is only one intermittent fever, instead of the innumerable different kinds which nature

produces to spite the generalizing routinist!) “by very many and different febrifuges.” (I should like to know what constitutes the difference among these febrifuges? Where is it distinctly defined in your text-books, so that we may know to which of the innumerable kinds of intermittent fever each of your many and different febrifuges is suitable? Can the works on *materia medica* of Hecker or his allies give us, besides the name and natural history of medicines, the very smallest definite information regarding the special remedial tendencies or the differentiating, the characteristic properties ascertained by experience of the action of each of their medicines, so as to enable us to select the most appropriate remedy for each case, and cure it with certainty; and not, as is generally done by you, be compelled to go blindly and at random from one febrifuge to another? Miserable practice, in which no one can ascertain which of the many febrifuges he ought to choose for any particular case in order to cure it with certainty, but must arbitrarily catch at whatever comes into his hand! Pitiableness!)

Although it is distinctly taught in the *Organon of Rational Medicine*, and is obvious to every sensible person, that dissimilar diseases ought not to be treated all in the same manner, notwithstanding that they bear the same name (bestowed on them by men), and that these diseases, notwithstanding that the pathology of the schools gives them a definite name, are anything but identical, indeed there is not one single case which does not differ from another in important points, yet Hecker (p. 69), (for diseases, every case of which differs and is often very un-

like the others) "for angina polyposa, for pneumonia, for internal inflammations, for typhus or synochus, for podagra, for dysentery, for apoplexy, etc., for each of these names of diseases, has a remedy which is invariably helpful."

Here we see the bias towards old wives' practice, the irresistible tendency to blind empiricism which still possesses the minds of those who think themselves so wise! Away with such empirical practice which is led by a mere nosological name!

Every case of disease must be investigated singly and individually and the appropriate remedy found for it in particular. This is the problem I have solved and solve daily in my practice. Among ten cases on which the ordinary physician bestows the common name of "pneumonia," and attaches much importance to this name, there is perhaps not one which exactly corresponds to any of the other cases, consequently it will not yield to the same medicine, cannot have the same remedy. This the ordinary pathology, which deals in obscure generalities, never perceives. Diseases, which appear to have only some distant resemblance to one another, are instantly and inconsiderately held to be identical, and unconcernedly treated all in the same way. And this is called rational medicine!

A little further on in the same page (69) come the already refuted mendacious allegations against the homœopathic method, which are unconnected and inconsequent—frivolous misunderstandings and idle talk.

What Hecker says (pp. 71-73) about the smallness of the doses of homœopathic remedies is also nothing but a

misunderstanding. A child reading the *Organon* would comprehend it better. To solid experience he opposes empty words.

Among other things Hecker informs the reader (pp. 72, 73): "Physicians have given one and several grains of powerful medicines daily to healthy and sick persons, and have often failed to perceive the production of any effects appreciable by the senses." It is palpably untrue that physicians have hitherto given or seen given to healthy persons even single grains of powerful medicines either daily or quarter-yearly. And in diseases? What may they there have seen? seeing that the effects of the medicines are mixed up with the symptoms of the diseases, and besides *a single, simple, medicinal substance was hardly ever exhibited alone*, not even in disease, but in combination with several other drugs. Under such circumstances what could they have seen or observed? Why nothing at all! What's the object of this silly talk?

And so Hecker goes on, at p. 74, where in reply to my remark supported by experience—that medicines applied externally, act upon the body even through the skin, and that powdered cinchona bark laid upon the abdomen has cured ague, etc.—he delivers this tirade: "It is well known how little these assertions agree with the experience of other physicians." A bad shot this of the illustrious Court-counsellor and Professor! Other physicians have actually had such experiences. It is only too well known, although your self-sufficiency knows nothing about it, that, *e.g.*, powdered cinchona bark merely applied externally did this, as Pye (*Med. Obs. Inqu.*, II., p. 245),

and the *Schlesischen ökonomischen Nachrichten* (VI., p. 304), testify. And as regards the action of emetics on the internal organism through the skin, which Hecker also denies, the physicians have certainly not observed the power of ipecacuanha to cause vomiting from its external application, but only owing to the trifling circumstance *that they never tried it*. But Benjamin Hutchinson (*Memoirs of the Med. Soc.*, V.), observed several cases in which the rubbing in of tartar emetic externally was followed by long *continued nausea and vomiting*.

But facts are a trifle to a man who considers empty words to be the chief merit of a physician, and his own unfounded assertions oracular deliverances.

In the September number of his charming *Annals* Hecker continues his labors, and criticizes an essay of mine which appeared some years ago in *Hufeland's Journal (Illustrations of the Homœopathic Use of Medicines in Ordinary Practice)*, which was republished, with alterations and additions, in the Introduction to the *Organon*.* The aim of this essay is to show that here and there cures were made by other physicians of a homœopathic character like that taught by me; that is, by medicines which, according to the observations of other physicians, whose names are given, had the property of producing similar symptoms. I may here admit that among the hundreds of cases there recorded there may very likely be a few which might not be absolutely pure observations,

* [In the first four editions of the *Organon*. It is omitted in the fifth edition.]

because it was not the intention of their authors to furnish such instances. Still, the majority of the cases here collected are testimonies in favor of the homœopathic method of a very striking character. We shall see what the objections to the cases which Hecker makes such a to do about are worth. He makes as much fuss over them as a hen when she has laid an egg, even when it is a yolkless one. He assumes such important airs over his so-called objections as if the welfare of the commonwealth depended on them.

But the homœopathic principle will remain everlastingly inexpugnable, even though a few of the cures by other physicians adduced as instances of homœopathic treatment had not occurred, or even if the whole lot of them had never taken place. What does it matter to my system whether one or several hundreds of such accidental homœopathic cures by ancient or modern physicians can be authenticated or not, seeing that they were not cases treated intentionally on homœopathic principles, and in the crude form in which they are presented they cannot be regarded as examples of the homœopathic method worthy of imitation, *and were never recommended by me as such.*

I might therefore pass over this subject as of no consequence to the main question, and leave unnoticed all that Hecker, with a great show of learning, has to say against some of them, *while omitting all mention of the other important cases*, were it not that he is guilty of gross exaggeration and inaccuracies in his account of them and makes them the occasion of a great outpouring of his scorn.

Hecker commences in an exceedingly disparaging tone which every honorable man must treat with merited contempt. His abusive language deserves no notice except a shrug of the shoulders! Of such flowers of rhetoric Hecker is *professor publicus ordinarius*. No one will envy him this title.

As regards his mercantile speculations at p. 194, one need only remember what a heap of books Hecker himself has published in 1810, of which none display any originality, and all of which are destitute of intrinsic value. His high and mighty dogmatism is the principal thing in them.

Further on in the same page he quotes a passage from my earlier essay, from which one sees that his excess of envy and hatred deprives him of all sense; "And if here and there some sage" (I alluded to Hippocrates, Detharding, Boulduc, Bertholon and others, *vide* Introduction to *Organon*, p. xlvi. [5th Edit., p. 45]) "ventured in a mild way to oppose the ordinary practice, and to propose *similia similibus* instead, their protest was not attended to." Here Hecker inserts my name in brackets after "here and there some sage." A very sorry joke. "Here and there some sage" cannot possibly refer to one single man; it necessarily implies several. It is the height of absurdity even for Hecker to imagine that the words "here and there some sage" apply to me; one can only conclude that his passion for sneering has deprived the poor man of his understanding. Moreover, it is not at all the case that I have opposed "*in a mild way*" the pernicious system of medication taught and practiced by

Hecker and his set. When I have denounced it, I have done so in the most vigorous language, so as to make their ears tingle, in order, if possible, to rouse them out of their routine lethargy.

When Hecker, in this article, asserts that the distinction of the two utterly different—indeed, absolutely opposite—therapeutic principles: *contraria contrariis* and *similia similibus* is all moonshine, he only shows his incapacity to see the thing correctly, or that he will not see it with open eyes. What he says to the contrary is the worthless private opinion of an ignoramus.

At p. 195, in a note, he congratulates me that I have daily and hourly experience of the successful results of the homœopathic method, which were unknown to the physicians of several unenlightened thousands of years. As what I say of the success of my practice is literally true, I accept the compliment with thanks.

But as Hecker knows nothing but routine treatment, and refrains from making trial of the better way on account of his incredible over-estimation of himself, of his prejudices in favor of tradition, and of his love of scholastic subtleties, he must forego the pleasure of being such a successful practitioner.

At p. 197 Hecker appears in all his glory. The observations of the symptoms of medicines collected with great labor from medical works, and the homœopathic cures by means of the corresponding medicines by other medical writers, as far as can be deduced from their statements, he calls “histories of cures raked together.” It is generally supposed that only what lies in a heap can

be raked together—like the undigested rubbish which Hecker has lying around him, and which he only needs to rake together and distribute among a number of books and articles in order to satisfy his mercantile speculations, not in order to benefit humanity.

These remarkable data in the Introduction to the *Organon* (and the *Illustrations*)—every one who reads them can form his own judgment of them—Hecker calls them “paltry stuff,” and laughs and sneers at them, and yet they are facts related by physicians, any one of whom is of more value and is more trustworthy than Hecker and all his crew together.

In order to upset facts by contemptuous words, he first tries his inventive powers: “It is very likely that Dimerbrock, after being deprived of his pipe of *tobacco*, when he again took to it was cured of his vertigo, nausea and anxiety, but it was not the power of *tobacco* that did this.” This is the way Hecker perverts the facts of history by mendacious suppositions and invented circumstances!

Because Zacutus is several times quoted as one of my authorities, Hecker draws the conclusion (p. 198): “That Hahnemann thinks a great deal of this man.” It is only a Hecker that could make such inferences. I have never said a word in praise of Zacutus, though it is very likely he may have been more trustworthy than Hecker, who is an adept only in perverting facts.

At p. 199 he says. “A *fright* has certainly more often caused convulsions in a much greater number of persons than *tobacco*; has it also ever cured the epilepsy?” Most certainly, I reply, in certain cases, when discreetly used.

Every one at all versed in the history of medicine is familiar with the celebrated cures of many young persons in the Haarlem poor-house affected with epilepsy, by the mere fright caused by their being threatened with the application of a red-hot iron. These cures redound to the honor of Boerhaave, and are recorded by his nephew, Abraham Kaaw. Only our Court-counsellor and Professor Hecker knows nothing about them.

The power of *anise-seed* oil to allay colic is dismissed by Hecker (p. 199) with the usual syncretism of the routine practitioner: "It is all one whether we give oil of *cedar, cinnamon, cloves, anise or fennel; gum arabic* does the same." To the *philosophical* physician they are *all the same*, however much they may differ in their nature and action! He lowers himself to the level of the *most ordinary* practitioner.

Thereupon he makes a terribly long uproar on the subject, filling two pages; he asserts that Forest did not observe that *anise* oil caused colic, as I stated; he quotes long Latin extracts and makes a dreadful fuss about it. If I have rendered Forest's expressions somewhat stronger than I ought to have done (although Forest certainly intended to convey that meaning by his "*quo quidem* [anise oil taken in wine] *dolore [colico] magis exacerbato*"), it was surely not worth making such a noise about. I may make Hecker a present of the whole passage referring to *anise* oil, it is not an *experimentum crucis*. Hecker must leave unrefuted the hundred other far more important facts relating to the homœopathic action of medicines. As regards these far more striking examples, so convinc-

ing to every unprejudiced mind, Hecker has nothing to say, so he only girds at the trifling examples, *ut nodum in scirpo quaerat*. A wretched kind of labor!

After quoting (p. 202) a portion of the passages in the *Illustrations* relating to *arsenic* (but prudently omitting its important property connected with angina pectoris) he accuses me of telling gross falsehoods! He says: "Knapé, whom Hahnemann adduces as an authority for certain symptoms of *arsenic*, has taken these symptoms from law reports and says so openly." What a monstrous crime it was of me to give Knapé as my authority when he only quoted these symptoms! Do such facts lose all trustworthiness when an honest man takes them from law reports,* and thus makes himself responsible for the correctness of the transcription? Under what other (short) name could I have adduced these extracts? It is evident that Hecker is resolved only to find fault, and so he makes a great fuss over unimportant things, partly because he cannot make any serious objection to my citation of these examples, partly in order to distract the reader's attention from the appreciation of the great truths set forth in the text.

At p. 203 Hecker—to whom we owe no observations relative to the effects of simple medicinal substances, but

* Hecker makes a remark which casts a slur on Knapé's good name: "In this loose way Hahnemann selects his authorities." Is the authority of the law reports quoted by Knapé a loosely chosen, inadmissible authority? In this disdainful manner does Hecker speak of honorable persons and important matters! What does the reader think of that?

only a lot of petulant, worthless words about them—makes as though he knew positively that “*arsenic only* causes an inflammation that rapidly passes into sphacelus.” If only he would forbear to pose as though his knowledge were the *non plus ultra*, of all knowledge! *Habita tecum et noris, quam sit tibi curta suppellex!* *Arsenic* produces many other effects of which Hecker, as we see here, does not know a syllable.

The somewhat superstitious notions entertained by the ancients with regard to the mode of action of the *magnetic plaster*, were long known to me. But that, notwithstanding the vain delusions respecting the mode of action of medicines which the physicians of ancient and modern times held, they made some cures by means of the homœopathic power of medicines, all unconsciously and even in direct contradiction to their dogmas, it was the object of my collection of examples to show. They are calculated to teach that the medicines did not act in conformity with the manifold indications imagined by the physicians, but according to the homœopathic principle, when they effected *rapid and permanent* recovery. I have endeavored to show what they *accomplished* with the medicines, not how they *explained* their action. Is Hecker able to see this, or is it rather the case that he will not see it?

After this (p. 204) he declaims in great style and with a great display of learning and numerous quotations but only—*de lana caprina*. The thing that excites him is this; some physicians, Slevogt, Molitor and Zacutus found *arsenic*, which has the power of producing a kind of dysentery, useful in some kinds of bloody flux. On this

Hecker raises a tremendous outcry and seeks to prove "that Zacutus asserts no analogous action from the internal use of *arsenic*." But he is quite wrong, the passage quoted by Hecker himself (p. 206) proves that Zacutus employed *arsenic* (sulphuret or not sulphuret has nothing to do with the matter) as a lavement for this purpose. Does not Hecker know that enemata act as internal remedies on the whole organism? What on earth do I care for Zacutus's superstitious employment of the *emerald*?

"As regards intermittent fever," continues our omniscient Hecker, "it may be mentioned that a hundred things can cause fever, which certainly do not cure the intermittent fever,* and that, on the other hand, it is curable by just as many things which have no power to cause fever." Both these assertions are untrue and an unwarranted allegation of a man who does not know anything like a hundred things that can cause fever and only asseverates at random that they can certainly cure the intermittent fever (just as though there were but one kind of intermittent fever!). His "certainly" is the outcome of his lofty *ἄουτος ἔφα*: Hecker has said it! he contents himself with a simple denial instead of proofs. What are the

* It is only a perversion of the truth to say that the homœopathic doctrine teaches that any drug which causes any kind of fever, *quæcunque sit*, must be able to cure intermittent fever. No! it is not any kind of fever or even any kind of intermittent fever that a medicine must be capable of causing, but it must be able to cause a *very similar* kind of intermittent fever in order to cure a similar kind of intermittent fever. That only is homœopathy! Can Hecker not or will he not understand this much?

drugs that have no power to cause fever and which have yet the power to cure intermittent fever? Is it enough that Hecker makes such silly assertions at random, without reflecting that he cannot prove an iota of them? It is evident that his assertions are on a par with his knowledge; but with what assumption, with what arrogance he speaks so impudently about things which he *does not in the least* understand, and for the elucidation of which many years and numerous honest observers (not of Hecker's kind) are required.

The property of *jalap* to allay griping and restlessness Hecker will not admit (p. 208) for this reason "because *magnesia*, which causes neither griping nor restlessness, also *almost always*" ("almost always," what a fine practical definite expression!) "allays griping and restlessness." Hecker does not know that *magnesia* does not "almost always" allay griping and restlessness, but only when morbid acidity in the *primæ viæ* is the cause of this ailment. It is thus not a homœopathic but a purely chemical remedy. No sensible educated and honest man would think there was any analogy between a purely chemical remedy, as *magnesia* is in this case (for the allaying of such an ailment a large dose is required in order to neutralize the acids in the *primæ viæ*) and a remedy like *jalap* which acts only in a dynamic and virtual manner in removing griping and restlessness, seeing that only a minute particle of the latter when employed for this purpose is needed, if its other medicinal symptoms correspond with the case. Hecker fabricated this parallel evidently because he did not understand the *Organon*, or because he deliberately

intended to create a confusion of ideas. What a gross perversion of argument: to adduce the qualities of a merely chemical remedy to refute the homœopathic action of a merely dynamically acting medicine! Does Hecker imagine that the falsity of his analogy will escape observation?

Further on Hecker says: "Hahnemann had first to arise to teach us a method of cure in such conformity with nature." What a paltry sneer! Must not everything that is to have a commencement be first broached by some one? How otherwise could a new better method of cure originate? Does not Hecker understand that? If the truth were of benefit to the world, it must be brought to light by some one, whether he bear my name or another's; but what has that to do with the subject?

"Many burning acrid things besides *clematis*," continues Hecker; "cause eruptions and cure none, and, on the other hand, many eruptions are cured by things that never cause any." If the welfare of mankind can be promoted by unfounded assertions, then we must confess that the salvation of the world depends on Hecker. But, God be praised! it depends on quite the opposite. Where are the many burning acrid things, whose internal use (for it is only a question of this) causes eruptions without their being able to cure such? Let Hecker tell us their names if he would avoid the imputation of making mendacious allegations! And, again, what are the things which heal eruptions quickly and permanently by being administered internally (for there is no question here of their external employment; that may be left to

routinists unconcerned about the consequences of their treatment), but which never cause such eruptions? What does the reader think of such an irrational style of argument?

It remains eternally true that medicinal substances which are capable of producing certain eruptions (for their number is enormous) by their *internal* administration, can and must cure similar eruptions when given only internally. More than this is not needed to establish the truth of the homœopathic law of cure according to nature. What only smarts and erodes the skin when applied externally is quite another thing, and does not belong to the present subject.

Notwithstanding all Hecker's asseverations (p. 209) Marcus's cure of an inflammation of the tongue in 48 hours by *mercury* shows that in this case *mercury* acted homœopathically. All the tergiversations, all the improbable and untrue general statements made by Hecker are of no avail against the truth. It is perfectly plain that he only will not admit the truth, although it is of no earthly consequence whether he does so or not.

At p. 210 Hecker denies flatly that "Amelung cured a kind of ulcerative pulmonary disease by means of *lead*." It is insolent injustice and presumption to seek to deny facts which cannot be proved to be unfounded by contradictory facts. The expression employed by Hecker, "*Lead* has never cured a real ulcerative pulmonary disease," merely displays his pathological prepossessions. Just as though, besides that rarer kind of ulcerative pulmonary disease which has hitherto been deemed incurable

ble, there were not other and many other kinds of actual suppuration of the lungs with very diverse symptoms! Who can deny that Amelung cured one of the latter? “*A kind of ulcerative pulmonary disease Amelung cured*” were the words I used.*

The ophthalmia from *rose-water* observed by Echius and Ledelius is thus dismissed by Hecker (p. 210): “These were a couple of old superstitious historians.” How paltry! What has age to do with trustworthiness? Superstitious! Along with superstition (in explaining the causes of the symptoms), which is common enough among modern physicians, may there not be perfect honesty in recording what was observed? It is evident that Hecker despises everything except his own infallible *ego*; but he seems not to be aware how despicable he is in so doing. Ledelius was assuredly no common, short-sighted, dishonest observer.

And where are the many persons whom Hecker would produce who have bathed their healthy eyes with *rose-water* without injury? What kind of gift of observation had they? Where are their trials and observations recorded?

Hecker goes on: “Hahnemann says that *euphrasia-water* inflames the eyes; which is not true.” But I never said that the observers Lobelius, Bonnet and Simon Pauli saw ophthalmia result from the use of *aqua euphrasiæ*. How can Hecker tell such untruths? It was the internal use of the expressed juice and the powder of this plant

* [This case is omitted in the later editions of the *Organon*.]

that, according to the experience of these physicians, caused a kind of ophthalmia. In this manner does Hecker pervert my words by his own fabrications! And as regards its remedial power we have (among others) the testimony that among the Icelanders the internal use of the expressed juice of this plant is in great repute for a kind of painful ophthalmia. Everything modern is not deserving of commendation; everything antiquated and gone out of use does not merit contempt!

Farther on, at p. 211, Hecker makes a liberal use of the words "impudence" and "falsehood," which may very appropriately be applied to himself. "Cough from a chill," he says, "goes off spontaneously and is curable by infusions of plants and tisanes of many kinds." Fine empiricism! Infusions of plants of various kinds, *quidquid in mentem venerit!* Has Hecker never met with coughs from a chill which remained uncured notwithstanding all such routine infusions? If he has not, his practical experience cannot be great. Vicat says that he cured a boy nine years old of a cough caused by a chill with *dulcamara* (*Mat. Med.*, I., addit. p. 366).

I ought to have mentioned the name of De Haen as voucher for the power of *dulcamara* to cause *convulsions and delirium*, and for its efficacy, in smaller doses, to cure *homœopathically similar convulsions and delirium*. By mischance this physician's name was mentioned in connection with "sufferings from a chill." Hecker's denunciation, consequent on this omission gives me the opportunity to supply this omitted illustration of homœopathy!

In order to invalidate Carrère's statement "that *dulca-*

mara produces affections from a chill," which I have cited, Hecker disparages this physician and calls him "a stiff humoral pathologist." Just as though Carrère's mode of explaining the phenomena had anything to do with the matter! We are only concerned with what he *observed*, but not with his *explanation* of it. The best observer may be a humoral pathologist or a solidar pathologist or anything else; what has that to do with the authenticity of his observations? Cannot Hecker see the distinction?

Hecker next gives a long extract from Carrère, in which there is no mention of the sufferings from a chill in connection with *dulcamara*, in order to show that Carrère does not mention sufferings from a chill. But he omits the passages where Carrère really speaks of them, *e.g.*, where, after a slight exposure to cold damp air when taking *dulcamara*, there came a trembling of the hands and paresis of the tongue (Carrère in Starke's edition, p. 122), twitching movements of the lips and eyes (*ibid.*, p. 145), compared with what Carrère and Starke adduce at p. 249. But Hecker finds it more suitable for his plan of contradicting me to quietly leave out all that properly belongs to the subject. What does the reader think of such conduct? The remainder of his drivel, at p. 213, is so silly that it deserves no notice.

After quoting what I have said about the remedial power of *squill* in pleurisy, he exclaims (p. 214) that it is untrue. "No system," he says, "has recommended the exclusive employment of relaxing sedative remedies for the cure of pleurisy, as Hahnemann alleges, but irritating

things have always been employed in this disease." So much the worse if the traditional rational medical art acted so inconsistently as to employ the most relaxing remedies, such as frequent blood-letting, along with irritating substances. But such was not the case. In recent times, in addition to *squill*, physicians have prescribed for pleurisy *nothing* but such things as I have indicated. Tissot says in his *Anleitung, f. d. L. V.*, § 95: "Venesection, emollient and attenuating drinks, fumigations, enemata, decoctions of squill, emollient poultices are the true remedies." And what further testimony do we require when Hecker himself (pp. 234 and 238) says: "We cure in the most positive manner inflammations and pneumonia by means of venesection." Is there anything in the world more relaxing for human beings than repeated venesections? And are not the other prescriptions of physicians in this disease of a relaxing and debilitating character? Is not this method of treatment in exact contradiction to that extremely irritant internal remedy, *squill*? And yet such distinguished practitioners as Tissot, De Haen, Pringle and Sarcone (with whom I was not first made acquainted through Murray) employed *squill* in inflammatory pleurisy; a treatment in direct contravention of the dogmatic relaxing system! Evidently because, notwithstanding all the injunctions of the dogmatism that directed the employment of relaxing remedies, they were convinced by its success of the utility of *squill*, and openly confessed the services rendered to them by it in this disease, and so (as I stated in the passage in question) paid homage to truth in defiance of the system!

Where then is the untruthfulness in this account of the undoubted facts? But Hecker perverts them and says (p. 214): "It never occurred to these physicians to pay homage to the truth by saying that *squill* cures pleurisy homœopathically." Did I ascribe to Sarcone, Pringle and De Haen homœopathic views in their treatment by *squill* when I said they freely confessed the benefit they saw from *squill*? It is only a Hecker who could condescend to such deceptions! The examples given in the *Illustrations* (and in the Introduction to the *Organon*) were all given to show that physicians effected cures with similarly acting medicines, which were homœopathic; *but without their being aware of it*. How then can Hecker falsely state that I attribute to De Haen, Pringle and Sarcone *homœopathic* views in their treatment by *squill*?

I say: "J. C. Wagner observed a kind of pleurisy produced by *squill*." Hecker says this is a falsehood, and invents all sorts of views that Wagner's expressions may have conveyed. "He wanted to ascribe the death of the patient to a surgeon," and, "besides *squill*, many other medicines were administered." The facts of the case are these: Wagner had been, for some days, giving a woman, aged 50, affected with dropsy and dyspnœa, a powder containing four grains of *squill*, eight grains of *nitrate of potash* and a scruple of *asclepias vincetoxicum*, without any other medicine. But as this powder only acted palliatively as a diuretic, and as, after several days without medicine, the dyspnœa increased, he gave her again one evening the same powder. Violent vomiting, great restlessness ensued, and a rheumatic pain in the arm, which

she had formerly suffered from, began to increase and extend to the pectoral muscles, for which she got diaphoretic waters and a fixed bezoard remedy;* but the following morning she got a violent attack of false pleurisy. (J. C. Wagner, *Observ.*, § 2.)

Any one can perceive, without my help, that in the evening, soon after taking the *squill* powder (for *asclepias vincetoxicum* in the *dry* state has very little effect), the pleurisy was commencing, and was neither prevented nor produced by the diaphoretic waters or the fixed bezoard remedy. Was I wrong in attributing the effect (pleurisy) to the four grains† of *squill*? Did I attempt to deceive the reader?

The allegation of several physicians who say they have seen a kind of phthisis cured by the *tin* in the *antihecticum Poterii*, Hecker meets as follows (p. 215): “*Antihecticum Poterii*, as is well known, contains no *tin*.” A bad shot, Professor Hecker! Poterius himself describes its mode of preparation (in *Opera*. edit. a Fried. Hoffmann, p. 297), from which it is seen that it consists of two parts of *tin* and one part of *regulus of antimony*, deflagrated with one-third part of *saltpetre*. When his followers, Stahl, Teichmeyer and the Brandenburg Dispensatory altered the formula, they retained the *tin* as the chief ingredient of the

* [Probably *sulphuret of antimony*.]

† Four grains of powdered *squill* for a dose (an *extremely* large quantity, as every one who knows anything about the subject will admit) our Hecker considers *a very small dose*? How little he cares for the life of his patients! For a reward, he should be allowed to take four grains of *squill* powder!

antihecticum. What does the reader now think of the ignorant assertion of Hecker: "*Antihecticum Poterii*, as is well known, contains no *tin*?" And yet he is a renowned professor!

I say: "Stahl observed a kind of phthisis caused by (the *antihecticum*) *tin*." On this Hecker remarks: "Stahl did not observe true phthisis caused by *tin*." Hecker says this as confidently as though he had been present, and as though the assurance of the honorable Stahl (*Mater. Med.*, Cap. 6, p. 83): "*It is certain that persons who have been using the antihecticum have fallen victims to phthisis*" was of no value in his eyes. It was not my business to find out what *kind* of phthisis this was.

In his comments on the excerpt from Werlhoff (p. 216) Hecker goes far astray; it does not prove what he wants. No one can tell the exact time when a gonorrhœa ceases to be inflammatory. Enough! *Cantharis* has *cured* gonorrhœa, and it can also *cause* gonorrhœa. That suffices to show the complete homœopathicity of its action, and this is all I intended to do in this passage in the *Illustrations*.

In persons accustomed to drink *tea* every day the primary action of this beverage, to which they have become habituated cannot be observed with precision, more especially by the over-busy practitioner. "What can one single case prove?" says Hecker (p. 217). I give not one case only, but two, in which pains in the stomach were caused by drinking *tea*. Chinese *tea* is a medicinal plant; who can deny that? And as such it must produce in sensitive healthy persons unaccustomed to its use, disa-

greeable medicinal symptoms, even though all physicians had hitherto been so careless as not to notice them ; but that is not the case. *Several* physicians have observed them, and others have seen cures by it of homœopathically corresponding symptoms. Nothing more need be said on this subject.* Moreover, it is not true “that *all* convulsions occurring before the outbreak of small-pox rapidly disappear on the development of the eruption,” as Hecker asserts.

At p. 217 Hecker quotes from Geoffroy two *secondary effects* of the immoderate, long-continued use of *tea*—diabetes and emaciation—and asks “if tea will cure these diseases?” It is evident from this that he has not understood the teachings of the *Organon*, otherwise he would not require diseases to be *homœopathically* cured by the *secondary effects* of a medicinal substance. He is ignorant of that on which he pretends to sit in judgment.

Further, it is not true what Hecker so impudently asserts: “That any fine dust of any acrid substance, as also mineral vapors, cause *just the same* medicinal symptoms as those attributed by Geoffroy to *ipecacuanha* dust.” Let him mention any reliable observations to this effect ; for that his *ipse dixit* is worth not more than the babble of a child is well known to every one. Moreover, *ipecacuanha* dust, as its extremely mild taste and smell show, is neither acrid nor corrosive, as Hecker’s art of perverting facts would make it out to be. The power

* [This paragraph about *tea* is only met with in the first edition of the *Organon* ; it will be found in my translation, p. 215, note.]

of *ipecacuanha* dust to cause hæmorrhæge, Hecker imagines I took from Murray's *Apparatus Medicaminum*. A bad shot! Murray mentions it in the third part of his *Practical Library*: "During the pulverizing of *ipecacuanha*," he there says, "it has been observed by various authors that those standing near have been affected with dyspnœa, epistaxis and hæmoptysis." Not only those engaged in pulverizing the drug, but even persons in the vicinity! In addition to Murray, not only did Geoffroy observe epistaxis and hæmoptysis, but also Lemery (*Traité univ. d. dr.*, p. 438) saw the former symptom from *ipecacuanha* dust.

At p. 219 Hecker gives all sorts of theoretical reasons, out of his own head, against the power of *arnica* to produce symptoms similar to those experience (much more valuable than Hecker's experience in his study) has shown to occur in the whole organism after blows and bruises. "It is not true," says Hecker, "that *arnica* causes such symptoms." It is impossible to imagine anything more arrogant, seeing that De Meza, Vicat, Crichton, Collin, Aaskow, Stoll and Joh. Chr. Lange actually witnessed the accidents caused by *arnica*, whereby this plant is enabled to remove homœopathically the similar general ill-feeling of the organism* incident to contusions, and so put nature in a position to restore to

* "Do all persons injured by contusions," asks Hecker, like a little inexperienced boy, "get these symptoms?" "Yes," I reply; "experience would teach him, were he able to observe with an unprejudiced and calm mind, that all persons severely injured in this way suffer more or less from the symptoms I have mentioned."

the normal state the congestions and weaknesses of the locally injured part. Thus, *arnica* cures *homœopathically* the contusion-disease, and so, indirectly, the contusion itself. Hecker's unfounded doubts and his contemptuous sneers are equally futile.

These, then, are the insignificant objections Hecker makes to this collection of examples from the writings of the physicians, called *Illustrations*, by which I show that diseases have often been cured by medicines which, according to the observations of other physicians, are capable of producing similar symptoms, manifestly on the homœopathic principle, which however they were not aware of. I purposely refrained from mixing up with them any of my own experiences. Every unprejudiced person will only see here, that the medicines, even in the hands of those who did not know their positive action, effected these cures according to the eternal inexpugnable law of homœopathy (*similia similibus*). *To the power of medicines to cause similar symptoms is owing their cure of similarly disposed diseases.* But how much more frequently and thoroughly must the cure be effected, when we know the medicines accurately with respect to *all* their positive effects.

Hecker cannot do anything to the detriment of this truth. The authors quoted by him, chiefly for the sake of ostentation, prove nothing satisfactory to his love of contradiction. He can only nibble away in an impotent manner at a few of my examples; but the remainder, the strongest ones, of striking homœopathic cures, in this collection, he must leave untouched. Even though I had

never collected them and had not put them in the Introduction to the *Organon*, the homœopathic doctrine still remains an unassailable truth, and all the prejudices of Hecker and his adherents will become antiquated and consigned to oblivion.

After Hecker has done his best to upset some of my examples of homœopathic cures, he commences, at p. 220, to draw a sort of deduction from his previous argument. Nothing less will serve him than "to show the pernicious influence which the homœopathic doctrine must have on practical medicine, should it ever become the prevailing method."

How is it possible that a traditional *true* practical medicine, if there be such a thing, could ever suffer damage from the private opinion of a single man like myself? If the so-called medical art of Hecker and his allies were well founded, or were its doctrines and maxims not contradictory, not the product of imagination, were it, on the contrary, in conformity with nature and consequently transmutable into salutary operation at the bedside of the sick, what would it have to fear from a little book of not many pages like my *Organon*? Hecker would not make such a stubborn fight if he did not feel deeply the weight of the homœopathic doctrine, if he did not feel that his so-called true practical medical art, that monster of irrational quackery with unknown, dangerous medicines in complex mixtures (*mors in olla*), enveloped in a specious dust-cloud of self-contradictory *a-priori* conjectures, would be overthrown and annihilated by my self-consistent and enlightened therapeutic doctrine which is in conformity

with nature and experience. It is only by the might of its inherent truth that this doctrine will win the conviction of the whole medical world. I contribute nothing to this result except a clear statement of it; I have no political influence, no converting weapons; I am not at the head of any powerful faction. If my doctrine convinces medical men and weans them from the senseless and flagitious ways of routine practice garnished with *a-priori* speculations, and converts them to the salutary way of simple natural practice, it will only be owing to the omnipotence of truth. This commands the applause of every reflecting, honest, unprejudiced physician who endeavors to promote the welfare of his fellow-creatures, and all the tribe of Hecker can do nothing to its detriment, with all their fury and raving. *Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat.*

It is useless to vilify, as Hecker does, the teachings of the *Organon*, whereby patients can be certainly, rapidly, and easily cured on distinctly appreciable principles, as I could convince any one by practical demonstrations at the sick bed. It is not the incontrovertible truth, but only *he himself* that loses by his abuse and ranting, *if he still has anything to lose.*

Further on Hecker attacks the respectable authors of the articles in the *Philosophical Transactions*, the *Commercium Literarium Noricum*, and the *Acta Naturæ Curiosorum*, whence I have taken some of my examples. "The most despicable historians of past times," he says, "who accumulated observations in Decuria and Centuria and registered therein documents that exhibit their ignorance,

their childish superstition and their credulity, were good enough evidence for Hahnemann, whose conclusions are based on their utterances." My conclusions were based only on observation of nature and on my own experience, not on these records. My doctrine was long previously formed and laid before the public in the *Medicine of Experience* (the precursor of the *Organon*), before I sought for its corroboration from these records, which show that others had often cured diseases in a similar manner. But as regards the collections of those older learned societies which Hecker so shamelessly disparages, I may remark that they would always have been highly appreciated by *every age which practices and honors honesty and experience*. The collections in question modestly kept within the limits of experience, and real love of the art and respect for humanity influenced the authors fraternally to communicate their observations to the world honestly and truthfully. Their age was much less under the spell of superstition, than ours under that of hyperphysical hocus-pocus, their and our theories and explanations are dangled in the leading-strings of the prevalent systems; but their observations, for which only sound sense and honesty are required, were, like those of honorable, rational, truth-telling men, true and genuine. I wish that now-a-days observations were universally as faithful and honest! I wish Hecker had at least a portion of the honesty of those observers!

"That the subjects on whom the observations from these writings were made were almost all sick," as Hecker says (p. 220) is false; by far the largest number of those

who furnished the observations of positive medicinal symptoms recorded by other physicians and appended to my own observations in the *Fragmenta* were in good health. But the small remaining portion of observations made on patients has a certain value. One must be contented with what has been transmitted to us from former times, as not even so much can be expected from our own times, so poor are they in simple observation of nature; for Hecker and his set find it more to their interest to deluge us with hyperphysical speculations, bold assertions, empty conjectures, subtle sophisms and illusory demonstrations in their systematic works and periodicals.

One cannot tell whether Hecker, at p. 221, is speaking of my doctrine or of the collection of examples of homœopathic cures in the Introduction to the *Organon*, so confusedly are things mixed up with one another. I do not find my doctrine on this collection of examples; it was excogitated before this was made; the collection only serves to illustrate, in an accessory manner, the homœopathic cures obtained, though only accidentally, by others. Here Hecker repeats his contemptuous sneer at the "pungent snuff," namely the *ippecacuanha* dust, which is so mild and tasteless on the tongue. A miserable attempt at wit destitute of truth!

At p. 221, Hecker after talking big about "the old established principles," which he ludicrously enough credits his *ars conjecturalis* with possessing, returns to his exquisite statement "that medicines cannot cause on healthy or sick persons any definite, but only infinitely various effects," which, if it were true, would, as I have shown

above, prevent the possibility of any medical art, so idiotic it is.

I know not what sly enemy has tempted Hecker all at once, at p. 222, to deploy his little army of medicines and to cause it to march in platoons before our eyes. "The volatile, stimulating, antispasmodic, narcotic remedies," he says, "whose special influence on the sensibility is so well marked, are our most important remedies in the so-called nervous diseases" (divine generalization, what an easy business for us thou makest medical treatment), "and in sufficiently large doses, they cause symptoms which testify to that special influence on the sensibility." (Well now, that is an important conclusion of our professor! On the sensibility, that is, the feeling, medicines act! How far we have advanced in these enlightened times!) "With emetics and purgatives, with salines, with bitter substances, etc., we cure many diseases of the abdominal intestines" (When, during the employment of complex mixtures of medicines of these and other kinds, the ailments at length disappear *in course of time*, then a physician of Hecker's stamp says he has cured them; but what the precise nature of the case was, and which of the drugs in many complicated mixtures has been of use, or whether any one among them did good, and whether all were not rather hindrances to the spontaneous recovery, no one can conscientiously say), "and *every tiro* knows the morbid phenomena which *all* these things are capable of producing in those intestines." (Not at all! Not even a professor like Hecker, knows the effect of a *single one* of these substances, let alone of *all* of them; moreover, ac-

According to this Hecker, no medicine has any definite constant effect. How does this chime in with the assertion that every tiro knows the effects of *all* medicines? Can the contradictory process of blowing hot and cold from the same mouth be carried farther?) “with the diuretic remedies” (is there even *one single* trustworthy diuretic remedy, except it corresponds homœopathically to the greater number of the symptoms of the disease?) “we are able” (would to God this were not a vain boast!) “to combat many diseases of the urinary passages,” (and, owing to their neglect to differentiate the cases of disease and the medicines and their ignorance of the powers of the medicines, *often to make new diseases*, especially of the urinary passages!) “but these remedies also by many symptoms manifest their specific influence on those passages.” Who among those physicians of the Hecker sort, who confound all things, who mix everything together *quid pro quo* in one mess and hurry over their visits to their patients’ bedsides, ever takes the trouble to become acquainted with these specific influences and effects of every single medicinal substance, and learns to apply them to the advantage of therapeutics? Any commotion they may excite in the body when given in such hotch-potch mixtures can teach us nothing about the peculiar properties of each individual drug. Hecker scorns this knowledge as we have seen, and detests the system which possesses this knowledge.

The silly examples Hecker brings forward (p. 223) in support of his objections are: “Opium cannot cure vertigo because it can cause it, for experience shows that it

does not cure many cases of vertigo and that this affection" (just as though there were but one and not innumerable different kinds of vertigo!) "on the other hand ceases* after taking things which never cause vertigo." "Because *ipecacuanha* causes vomiting we cannot on that account say that it can also cure vomiting, because many things allay vomiting which have never caused it." "We cannot say that *cantharis* cures gonorrhœa, because gonorrhœa has followed its administration, seeing that in most cases it is most readily removed only by remedies which are incapable of causing gonorrhœa" (it may be suppressed by them, or it may cease in the course of time.)† "How little we can be guided by single symptoms in medical practice, has been already said."

Why then does Hecker always return to the quackish idea of treating one symptom of a disease with a medicine that contains this one symptom, seeing that the irrational and futile character of the single-symptom treatment is so

* When an affection at length *ceases* in course of time after the administration of a multitude of unsuitable remedies, that is mere quackery. It must be removed *quickly* and *permanently* if the remedy be the suitable one, and then it may be called a cure and not spontaneous cessation. If he knows any cases of vertigo, vomiting and gonorrhœa which have been cured rapidly and permanently and without any ill consequences by remedies which were never able to cause similar affections he must name the credible witnesses and observations, if he would not be convicted of untruthfulness!

† With the well-known simple bread pills, it ceases sometimes in from five to six weeks, that is to say, *when it would have spontaneously taken its departure in the course of time.* Is that a cure?

obvious? (Vide *Organon of Rational Medicine*, § 10, 2d note [5th edit., § 7, 2d note] where the despicable character of such improper treatment—attacking a single symptom of the disease—is pointed out). Indeed Hecker himself, at p. 65, quotes passages from the *Medicine of Experience*, in which I will not allow that there can be a real perfect cure unless *the greatest possible quantity* of all the disease-symptoms (the complex of symptoms) is covered by a medicine which contains these symptoms, or at least many of them, and especially the most striking and singular of them. How then can Hecker here again, without at the same time paying attention to the rest of the disease-symptoms (as common sense and my method enjoin), drive away vertigo with *opium*, vomiting with *ipecacuanha*, and that vague symptom gonorrhœa with *cantharis*, or make as though my system considered such miserable one-sidedness as good and commendable? These are falsehoods and the exact contrary of what I have taught! What does the reader think of such conduct?

Only what can extinguish as far as possible the whole group of the disease-symptoms is the true remedy; this only should be employed. That is what I teach in the *Organon* (§ 130. [§ 154 of the 5th edit.]. Any one who imputes it to me that I advise every sort of vertigo to be treated with *opium*, every kind of vomiting with *ipecacuanha*, and every kind of gonorrhœa with *cantharis*, without ascertaining if the morbid symptoms accompanying the vertigo are also contained in *opium*, if the phenomena of the affection accompanying the vomiting are represented

among the other medicinal symptoms of *ipecacuanha*, or if the kind of gonorrhœa he has to treat and the sensations and other symptoms accompanying it are also among the array of symptoms which *cantharis* can cause, acts grossly contrary to my teaching.

What follows, on pp. 223 and 224, where Hecker refers me to the reproduction—irritability—and sensibility view (*inapplicable* in practice) is idle *a-priori* rubbish of which I make him a present. If the ancients had been able to do anything judicious for the benefit of their patients with the *functiones naturales, vitales* and *animales*, and if the slightest success in the treatment of a single case of disease could have been expected from these general views, then the ancients like their modern successors would have been able to rely upon them with advantage in practice. But this they could not do. Nothing salutary could be expected from these generalities; they were nothing but idle theoretical flourishes designed to impart a rational veneering to this nugatory routine practice.

Then Hecker asks: “*Mercury* causes salivation, does it therefore cure salivation?” Certainly it does; and why should it not cure it when it actually does? In what ingenious hyperphysical non-natural manner, will he explain this fact, if it does occur, so that the explanation may be of *practical* use? For all our medical explanations should aim at nothing more earnestly, should promote nothing more immediately than true practical healing; they should not be mere frivolous scholastic trifling. When I see that every remedy only relieves quickly a disease whose symptoms are to be found in similarity among its

own symptoms, does not that reveal a fair prospect for the certain rational cure of other diseases? *Can there be a better founded explanation than that which in its application is actually always crowned by the desired result?*

At p. 224 (in No. 3) Hecker again makes merry over the collection of examples of homœopathic cures by other physicians. But this mixture of frivolity, perversion, folly and calumny does not deserve an answer, as his paltry objections have already been sufficiently disposed of above. From this collection of examples no one can be taught to cure; they are obviously not intended for such a purpose. This collection is merely an illustration of homœopathic cures performed accidentally by other physicians, without their knowledge, nothing more; they cannot in their crude form serve as models and were not meant to do so. What then is the object of all Hecker's despicable, miserable tirades? They miss the mark entirely. Even though the whole collection of examples had never been printed, the homœopathic system would still remain firmly established, and every *honest* man who gives it a trial can easily convince himself by experience of its infinite superiority to every other method of treatment hitherto employed.

At p. 225, Hecker gives us a bit more of his mind when he says: "But who can recognize and distinguish every definite kind of disease?" To which I reply: Any one who takes cognizance of the symptoms of each case of disease (*Organon*, § 62-71 [§ 84-92 of 5th Edit.]) And the probable exciting cause (§ 72, 73 [5th Edit., § 93, 94]) recognizes and distinguishes them. Cannot Hecker read?

Why does he pretend to be so stupid? It is written as plainly as possible.

“Who,” continues Hecker, “can *immediately perceive* in every kind of disease, to what specific remedy and to what dose of it it will yield on the spot?” I reply: I never said this should be *immediately perceived* in the patient; but he who holds it should be the physician’s object to indulge in theoretical generalisations and the quickest possible treatment of patients, would certainly prefer to perceive immediately by looking at the patient’s nose what kind of a disease he has, without the trouble of investigating minutely all the circumstances of the case and without carefully selecting from among the medicines at his command that one whose symptoms have the greatest similarity to the ascertained symptoms of the disease. But nature which imparted to us the capacity for accurate investigation, and our conscience, do not make it so easy for us as “immediately perceive” implies! The high vocation of the physician and his conscience will not permit him to be and to remain a mere routinist.

“When will Hahnemann,” says Hecker, “give us an accurate characteristic description of the hundred kinds of intermittent fever, each of which must be cured by a special remedy?” I reply: Where have I ever said that the infinite number of diseases must be first described before they have ever affected human beings? Evidently Hecker has neither read nor understood the *Organon*, otherwise he never would have asked such a question. It would be an absurd undertaking to endeavor to describe all possible diseases which inexhaustible nature

has ever produced or may in future produce in human beings. It is only the disease actually present that the physician has to investigate, *i.e.*, to take cognizance of and to distinguish by means of its symptoms (as the *Organon*, §62-73 [§83-94, 5th Edit.], teaches); it is only for the disease actually present that he has to select the remedy on homœopathic principles (v. *Organon*, §125 to the end [5th Ed., §146 to the end]); he does not require to do anything more. When, then, he knows how to investigate every single case of disease that turns up during his practical career and to cure it with the most appropriate (homœopathic) medicines according to the infallible principles of homœopathy, is he not thus the most perfect, most rational, most helpful practitioner of the art of medicine? What more is needed?

Hecker next asks (pp. 225 and 226): "When will Hahnemann give a precise description of the one particular kind of rabies which *belladonna* will certainly cure?" Answer: A physician never has to treat either rabies *in genere* nor a species of it whose exact character has been fixed beforehand. It is only the actual case of rabies he is called to treat, that he requires to investigate accurately in all its conditions and symptoms, in order then to ascertain if the group of symptoms present corresponds in the greatest possible similarity with a group in the pathogenesis of *belladonna*. If the case is not represented in the *belladonna* symptoms in the completest and most similar manner possible, and if its symptoms are contained in greater similarity among the medicinal symptoms of *stramonium* or of *hyoscyamus*, etc., then the one

that proves to be the most homœopathically similar is also the most efficacious; and, if the medicine selected in this manner is in its primary symptoms very like those of the case of rabies the physician can say beforehand that this *can*, this *must* cure. Cases of rabies that occur in practice may differ greatly from one another and yet all find in the pathogenesis of one or other of these plants their greatest possible similar, their remedy, in fact. Of what use would it be (even if it were practicable) to describe these possible cases of rabies beforehand, seeing that the physician must always specially investigate the case that comes under his treatment? Does not Hecker see this?

What Hecker says further on this subject shows either that he has not read the *Organon* or that he does not understand it or will not understand it. He does not deserve any confutation. He who *honestly* practices according to the homœopathic doctrine will be convinced by experience that it is the true, the only method that is beneficial, and will perceive how futile and paltry are the perversions and petulances which Hecker's poverty of mind tries to pass off for witty objections. Hecker will remain sticking in his old mud; there let him lie!

After expectorating a lot of vulgarities (p. 226) he returns to his joke which he imagines is so witty, but which is simply disgusting: "Had the Preserver of mankind given us a plain and simple hint in the nose-bleeding that pungent snuff can cause, that we should employ this same snuff in bleeding from the uterus," etc. What sensible and truth-loving man can call the extremely mild

ipecacuanha powder that has hardly any taste or smell a "pungent snuff!" Is this falsehood meant for a joke? Not only epistaxis but (what he here purposely avoids mentioning) hæmoptysis also has been seen to follow the inhalation at a considerable distance of the dust of this powder, which cannot have any acrid property so mild and tasteless it is, as has been before observed; this proves that *ipecacuanha* possesses the power to cause hæmorrhages, and that it may also cause uterine hæmorrhage, though the observations hitherto made do not go so far. That collection of examples which still remains a thorn in Hecker's eye is, as has often been said, merely an illustration of homœopathic cures unconsciously performed, but not an instruction as to how similar cures should be effected.

With similar exemplary honesty and impartiality—Hecker's cardinal virtues—our man now goes on to attack the *Organon of Rational Medicine*. For a refutation of the adverse criticism of my earlier writings which Hecker formerly made in his yellow *Journal*, and which I did not think it worth while to answer, I hope he will find in this little book enough to satisfy him; if not, there is plenty more at his service. My system of therapeutics can only be appreciated by persons of sound understanding but not by such as are afflicted with perversity and depravity of head and heart.

At pp. 228, 229, Hecker boasts, in a note, of his treatment of a child affected with caries; "A simpler treatment it is impossible to imagine."* So then, several

* What was the object of the repeated doses of *jalap*, when he was

medicines given simultaneously and successively, and yet nothing but *mercury* was of use; is that the simplest treatment imaginable? How far is such a man from the better way! Just hear what he says soon afterwards: "No competent medical man would employ *mercury* in caries, because it causes caries," thus we see plainly that he did not know and regard the only remedy for his case of caries (*mercury*) as the only medicine indicated, consequently that he here made a homœopathic cure unwittingly and involuntarily, just like the other physicians mentioned in the *Illustrations*. *Abeat cum cæteris!*

Mercury does not only cause caries in slow poisoning by the metal; it may cause it very rapidly (Michaelis in Hufeland's *Journal*) in its *primary* action. On the other hand the caries caused by *coffee* occurs only in the secondary action of this vegetable substance: it only comes on after long continued use of *coffee*, just as is the case with the caries resulting from the long continued administration of *conium maculatum*, and just as small-pox leaves behind it chronic induration of glands and caries in its secondary, and never causes it in its primary (acute) stage. When Hecker imagines that I include *coffee* among the homœopathic remedies for caries, he confounds primary and secondary actions. In all eternity no chronic

certain that the right remedy was either the *golden sulphide of antimony* or *mercury*? What was the use of the *antimony* if *jalap* alone, or if *mercury* alone were the proper medicine? and if the latter alone could and must cure, why then the *antimony* and the frequent doses of *jalap*? and besides these, why were the ulcers dusted with *cantharides*, if the internal remedies could and must effect a cure? And again, why the *myrrh* spread over the ulcers?

disease, like caries, will be cured by secondary actions; medicines do not come under the category of homœopathic remedies by virtue of their secondary actions. Will Hecker at length comprehend, or does he not wish to do so?

Hecker's vague denunciation of the *Organon* (pp. 229, 230) cannot influence any impartial, thinking reader. These will perceive that my therapeutic doctrine is a consistent, self-contained whole, which calls to its aid no hyperphysical speculations, takes its maxims only from nature and experience, and teaches every one how he, without allowing his head to be puzzled by the figments of Hecker and his adherents, can certainly, easily, quickly and permanently cure every case of disease on readily comprehensible principles and sure indications. The Heckerians cry out only because they are embarrassed; they cry out *because they dislike the daylight that reveals them in all their nakedness.*

At p. 230 again (for the fourth or fifth time, because he does not know what else to attack) Hecker alludes to *ipécacuanha* as a remedy for metrorrhagia, but he fails to perceive that the cures of hæmorrhage by this substance are not taught in the *Illustrations*, he fails to perceive that, because experience has not yet shown that *ipécacuanha* has caused metrorrhagia, it does not follow that it is incapable of doing so. In short, he does not and will not perceive.

He then proceeds: "From the circumstance that *mercury* can cause caries, is it quite plain to see that it must cure caries?" Hecker does not see it, certainly, but that

is because he will not see it. He perceives that if he admits the truth of homœopathy his whole systematic house of cards must tumble down. But poor house of cards, thou art already overthrown without his admission! Though Hecker does not, every *sensible* and *unprejudiced* person sees that if *mercury* can cause caries in its primary action, as it actually does, it would be *extremely unnatural* to refer its specific curative power in non-mercurial caries to anything else than to the law of homœopathy; just as every other medicine in the world cures only just those maladies and none other besides those it can cause in similarity in its primary action. I should have thought that when we see all bodies fall towards the centre of the earth it were not sinful to ascribe their falling to the power of gravitation and to make an advantageous employment of this law of nature in human life. What do you think, professor? Does your logic go so far?

At p. 231 Hecker accuses me of "sophistry and ignorance in the domain of *real pathology*." Hecker cannot know that sophistry implies perversions of words and false deductions from illusory premises (of which Hecker's whole life and work is composed), if he would call by that name the pure common-sense and the straight conclusions derived directly from nature and experience, without any admixture of speculative artifice or *a-priori* foolery, contained in the *Organon*. One must needs laugh when the lazy fellow calls the diligent worker a loafer.

Now, as regards my supposed "ignorance of real pathology." As every text-book of pathology and every academic teacher of pathology has a *different pathology*, one

of which is only distinguished from another by the greater absurdity of its hypotheses, while all *allow* to nature only a definite number and form of diseases, which she must only produce in the manner each author conceives according to his own imaginary hyperphysical conjectures, and as all these conjectures differ from those of every other pathological author, we may reasonably ask where among all these products of the brain is the only saving, true, *real pathology* to be found?

The statement in the *Organon*, "that we know absolutely nothing of diseases but their symptoms," is incontrovertibly true, though Hecker here denies it. Any one who denies this—be it Hecker or who it may be—let him tell us what we know definitely of diseases besides their symptoms? Nothing besides can be named to us except the *conjectures* of the schools, which, however, on account of their everlasting variations in the head of every teacher, cannot be held to be anything like definite by any person of sound understanding (*qui non nisi intra limites experientix sapit*). If no one can contradict this, and if no one can allege that diseases have anything else definitely cognizable but their symptoms (if any one knows otherwise, let him tell us! And why does not Hecker tell us if anything else definitely cognizable is to be found in diseases?), it follows naturally that in the investigation and treatment of diseases we have only their symptoms to go by. And "as we cannot discover in the action of medicines anything definitely cognizable besides their symptoms" (let any one come forward who can mention anything else definitely cognizable that refers with certainty to

their remedial power! But we cannot admit more conjectures not borne out by experience!), it follows, as we have no difficulty in perceiving, that the curability of diseases depends on the symptoms of medicines ascertained by experiment. Who can deny the validity of these conclusions?

Hecker says (p. 231): "Hahnemann lays less stress in the *Organon* than in his previous writings on single symptoms and on the selection of the remedy according to these." Let him refer us to any writing or any passage in which I have said that single symptoms should be our guide in the cure of diseases. Even in my first essay, published fifteen years ago, *On a New Principle*, I said nothing of the kind, but even then I insisted on giving a remedy which had the tendency to cause in the healthy body an artificial disease of the greatest possible similarity. What is the object of these perversions and figments of Hecker's? What does the unprejudiced reader think of them?

At p. 232, when quoting the statement in the *Organon*: "That the physician only has to remove the totality of the symptoms in order to cure, along with them at the same time, the alterations in the interior; therefore the totality of the disease—in fact, the disease itself," Hecker makes this inappropriate objection: "One cannot remove the totality of the symptoms of hunger, but hunger itself, and decidedly not homœopathically by things that cause hunger." One could not have believed that a professor in the most enlightened city in the world could have considered that attribute of good health, normal hunger, as

a disease to be cured by medicines. Can such silly ideas be termed real objections or refutations? or are they specimens of Hecker's wisdom? That morbid hunger, bulimia, cannot be removed by bread and meat, but only by a homœopathic medicine, which, in addition to its correspondence with the other symptoms, has a tendency to cause bulimia especially, is perfectly true, notwithstanding that Hecker knows nothing about it.

At p. 233 he refers to "fundamental medical doctrines which are attempted to be refuted by the teachings of the *Organon*." Where are such doctrines to be found, seeing that every teacher invents a different system? Why does he not say what they are, instead of wasting paper in this periodical with such a lot of empty babblement? Hecker, at p. 234, talks about the well-grounded knowledge we possess of the nature of diseases and the mode of action of remedies." Very good! But where is this to be found? whereon is it based? I am familiar with a hundred different views respecting diseases, constructed *ex theoria et hypothesi* by as many pathologists, and ten to twenty different modes of arbitrarily applying the powers of medicine—also determined *ex theoria et presumptione*—to theoretically constructed classes, orders and species of diseases, each differing from the others. Where, then, is the boasted "well-grounded knowledge of the nature of diseases and the mode of action of remedies?" Let him name them and cover us with confusion!

"It would," he continues, "be to degrade our science (?); it would be to reduce it to the level of the crassest empiricism" (everything that is not complicated with

hypothetical trash and transcendental rubbish Hecker and his allies call "crass empiricism!" If it could be settled by contemptuous words, they would soon effect their purpose!), "of the commonest domestic practice" (my deeply-pondered *Organon*, written not without a ripe study of nature, not without the maturest consideration, in which the instructions for treatment are only given in general formulas; in which no particular directions—such as: "*China* is good for fever," etc.—are laid down; in which, on the contrary, the nature of every individual case of disease coming under treatment, and of the remedy to be selected for it among all known medicines, with due consideration of all observable conditions, is insisted on—this, forsooth, must lead to the commonest domestic practice! Can the reader imagine anything more calumnious, anything more absurd?). "If we are to reject that knowledge (the "well-grounded knowledge" he means, which *nobody* knows), "and to impose such narrow limits" (all is too simple for you in the *Organon*, too little inflated by theoretical speculation, too uncomplicated!) "that we must be confined to a mere observation of symptoms, and our choice and prescription of medicines must be regulated solely by symptoms."

I confess with regret that the Creator, so far from having hid the cognition of every case of disease we have to treat in transcendental and learned poetical hypotheses, has so prosaically placed it in the careful observation of the morbid manifestations (symptoms)! I regret deeply that such an investigation of every case of disease according to the symptoms, for which only attention, sound sense and

scrupulous fidelity are required, is with its artless simplicity so extremely repugnant to the minds of Hecker and his adherents, accustomed as they are to over-learned artificialities. I am sorry that the plastered-up ruins of their systems, made up of stolen maxims, are shattered to fragments by the mighty force of the new-born truth! I regret that the plain effect of my medical doctrine, so innocent of scholastic subtleties, aids human beings to recover their health in a straightforward manner; but I am powerless against simplicity and mighty force of this beneficent truth, and I humbly beg pardon, as Galileo did for the earth moving round the sun!

“We need only,” continues Hecker in his boasting manner, “recall to mind the following, among countless similar facts, in order to show how enormously superior our rational medicine” (in the professorial chair! but God have mercy on the poor patients!) “is to the Hahnemannian empiricism and its shallow symptom-observation.” It is true, it is provoking, that the all-wise and benevolent Sustainer of mankind has deigned to permit his human children to obtain a knowledge of every single disease by such shallow symptom-observation. Hence my empiricism! whereby I am enabled to select the best remedy for any given case of disease according to fixed infallible principles, and to cure it more quickly, more easily, more certainly and more permanently than was hitherto possible. Naughty experience (ἐμπειρία)!

In order to confute the homœopathic therapeutic doctrine, Hecker, with marvellous acuteness, adds (pp. 234, 235): “Venesection never causes redness, heat, swelling

and pain ; never the complex of symptoms of any inflammation ; never anything similar to the phenomena of *pneumonia*, and yet we cure it therewith *in the most decisive manner* (?), we can explain these cures in a perfectly satisfactory manner." The explanation, Dr. Hecker, is really the *main thing* with you ; and the more involved it is, the more it is spun out of the remotest regions of hypothesis and transcendentalism, the more learned, consequently the more satisfactory does it seem to you. But the explanation—this hobby-horse of yours which goes stumbling over the graves of well-filled cemeteries—we will make you a present of it ; but first we should like to see pneumonia cured by venesection. When has it ever been cured by venesection only ? Were not other things employed at the same time ? if so, how can the cure be ascribed to venesection only ? (Rational medicine à la Hecker can do this !) There is no properly authenticated record extant of a pure serious case of pneumonia having been cured by venesection only ! Let Hecker refer us to one if he can ! And if the removal of the most prominent affection of the lungs and the heat of the body is obtained by this merely depressing operation, by this abstraction of the blood, which only diminishes the vital powers, the patient is not thereby restored to health—assuredly is not cured. The effect of such a great loss of blood is to make a peculiar serious chronic disease, and one cannot boast of a cure, seeing that the result of the abstraction of a great quantity of blood is only to substitute for a natural disease another artificial one. But this is what they call *curing*, *rational curing*. Where does the

rational come in in this badly conceived and pernicious procedure? Is there the slightest *rational reason* for the abstraction of blood when there is no real superfluity of blood in the body? Or is perhaps pneumonia produced only by a general plethora of blood, is the essential nature of pneumonia merely an *excess* of healthy blood, so that this excess can and must be reduced in a rational manner by its direct diminution? *Nothing of the sort!* This then is the precious rational medicine of which a court counsellor and professor is so immensely proud! You are welcome to your explanation of the cure of a severe pneumonia, *the possibility of which exists only in your own imagination*, for there is not *a single pure* case on record in which, by means of your (ever so lavish) prodigality of the precious vital fluid by venesection, this disease has been transmuted into health with striking rapidity, before the special natural relief (crisis) appeared, and which is able to dispense with this assistance.

“The same may be said,” he continues (p. 255), “of the vegetable acids and neutral salts” (no matter which of them!); “they cure inflammations though they have never caused any.” It would be something for Hecker and his school to be proud of if they could quickly cure and change into health even the majority of inflammations by means of venesection, vegetable acids and neutral salts. But that is by no means the case! They sometimes go off during the employment of these par-empirical remedies (prescribed without adequate reason) in nearly the same time as they would have taken to disappear without medicines; or rather somewhat later, so that the palliative

character of the treatment *adds about as much to the duration of the malady* as it takes from its severity. But many inflammations are *not* cured by them, either by venesection or by vegetable acids or by neutral salts, without the (rational?) practitioners being aware why those remedies did no good (otherwise they would not have employed them). This then is what is called real, incomparable, rational medicine!

“No one has ever heard,” continues Hecker, “that the array of symptoms constituting an inflammation of the liver has been caused by *mercury*; but this inflammation will be quite certainly” (in every case?) “cured by this metal.” How is it possible that Hecker could ever have heard of such medicinal symptoms of *mercury*, seeing that he and his authorities prefer to argue (it is easier!) than to institute experiments and observations of this kind, and that the true observers of former times are abused and rejected by him as “most miserable historians?” And is it impossible that a medicine, that *mercury* should have a tendency to cause a certain disease, notwithstanding that hitherto nothing was known, at least not to Hecker, of this its positive medical action? Will its cure of a similar malady be therefore less homœopathic because there had been no experience of this tendency, or because Hecker had never heard of it? But what he does not know (*quantum est*) thank God! others know.

When Hecker proceeds to deny all credibility to my observations of medicinal symptoms, we need only remember that it is Hecker that does this; nothing more need be said.

“We” (other rational physicians) Hecker brags, “cure definite forms of fever by definite remedies.” Would to God that were not untrue! How often does your so-called rational method fail to cure intermittent fever? Or, there occurs after the suppression of the periodicity of the fever a chronic febrile state, a kind of cachexy, which is worse than the intermittent fever was. Can that be called curing, in other words, restoring health? If what you call rational medicine has reasons for all it does (for not otherwise can it claim to be called *rational*), how ill founded must your reason be in cases where you have employed *cinchona* without effect, or with bad effects, as often, *very often*, happens! The other fever remedies, every one of them, you prescribe without knowing which of them is suitable for this, which for that case, and will certainly do good; so you give first one, then another, *quidquid in buccam venit*; and you never give one single medicine in one disease, but always in combination with one or several other drugs—and this you call your rational medicine, and so boldly impose on people that you can cure definite forms of fever with definite remedies. God forgive you the falsehoods and the martyrdom your so-called rational medicine inflicts on suffering humanity!

“*Cinchona* bark and similar (?) medicines,” says Hecker, “have never produced in any human being a relaxed, weakly constitution or a bronchial phthisis, and yet these morbid states are certainly cured by those remedies.” The peculiar kind of exhaustion and sinking of the vital power (with accessory circumstances) which *cinchona* removes, it can cause primarily in a high degree (see *Frag-*

menta). Other morbid weaknesses, not corresponding to it in similarity, *cinchona* cannot remove. Just as little can *cinchona* cure all kinds of cases of bronchial phthisis that occur in practice, *i.e.*, change them into health; and it cannot be decreed at the desk that *cinchona* must cure. Or, will he perhaps shelter himself behind the remedies said to be similar to *cinchona*? Why does he not name them, if he has anything *definite* to say about them?

“No girl in the world,” he goes on to say, “has yet been affected with chlorosis and amenorrhœa by *iron*,” He speaks of things as he understands them. What efforts has he made, in all his life, to ascertain what kind of defective menstruation *iron* can produce? Moreover, what *iron* contributes, as a *chemical* remedy in such cases, to the increase of the necessary quantity of *iron* in the blood, is an altogether different question, which has nothing to do with the subject of homœopathic cure by similarly acting medicines.

“Has any one ever heard of *mustard* baths and *mustard* plasters causing delirium?” he continues, “but we can at once remove delirium by the judicious employment of these remedies.” These generalizers, Hecker and his allies, are very fond of the word “judicious” which they never precisely define, and they shelter themselves behind it, though the manœuvre does not impose upon others. Whether the warm baths in which the *mustard* is the least powerful constituent, or *mustard* plasters, by the external pain they cause, can always and at once remove delirium, and cure this single symptom *permanently*, without at the same time eradicating the disease itself—this question I

will leave to be answered by the *single-symptom doctors* and their colleagues the barbers, shepherds, bath-women, farriers, etc., who also delight to call themselves "rational practitioners." It is easy to understand that delirium may be *temporarily* suspended* when another external disease of a very painful character has been produced on the patient by *mustard*! The power of warm water to remove mere heat of the body is *homœopathy*.

But now comes (pp. 235, 236) the crowning example of Hecker's judicial power. "As long as the world has existed," he says, "*mercury* has never caused syphilis, nor *mercury* and *sulphur* true itch, but millions have been cured of the diseases mentioned by these remedies." If this masterly attack is directed against the homœopathic system I am sorry that the Professor understands so little Greek that he fails to perceive what is the meaning of *homœopathic*. According to the *Organon*, natural diseases are extinguished and cured by *other similar* artificial diseases; perhaps the Professor will now at last understand that *similar* is different from *identical*. The cure cannot be *tautopathic* but *homœopathic*. Did it ever enter into the imagination of any one to say: venereal infection may be caused by *mercury* and true syphilis got just as in a brothel? Could such nonsense enter into the head of any one?

It is only the same stupidity that can believe that *sulphur* can cause real itch. One is ashamed to refute such

* This is nothing more than temporary suspension of one affection by another dissimilar one (see *Organon of Rational Medicine*, §§ 22, 24, 26, 27, and note to 271 [5th edit., §§ 40, 38]) a cure it is not.

self-evident absurdities. But that *sulphur* can cause an eruption that *closely resembles* the itch of workers in wool is shown every day by the effects of *sulphur* baths; and that *mercury* produces affections and sufferings which are very like those of syphilis may be seen in the observations of myself and other physicians.*

The following Heckerian questions require no answer—for if experiences are adduced, he denies them *ex theoria* and *pro libitu* and abuses the observers, who are much more honorable than himself, and that is for him the end of the matter. What can we do with such a man, who has made up his mind beforehand not to be taught, not to be convinced of the better way?

I leave it to the single-symptom doctors to tell how often hæmorrhages have been *permanently* quelled by *alum* which acts more chemically (*Organon*, § 271, 2d note)†

* [“Every practical physician knows that *mercury* may and does give rise to a train of symptoms bearing some analogy to those of secondary syphilis. Thus after the use of *mercury*, a patient may be attacked with feverishness, pains in the bones, nodes, sore throat and an eruption to which the name of mercurial eczema has been given. Here you perceive we have a remarkable analogy between the diseases produced by *mercury* and syphilis. *Mercury* when exhibited improperly may produce all the affections I have enumerated, and, in addition to these, caries of the bones.” (Grave’s *Clinical Lectures on the Practice of Medicine*,” vol. ii., p. 521). A beautiful corroboration of Hahnemann’s observations by a renowned physician of the Old School, published in 1843, the year of Hahnemann’s death!]

† [This note several times referred to is replaced in the subsequent editions of the *Organon* by the note to § 67 (5th Edit.). The reader may feel an interest in seeing what Hahnemann originally wrote on the

than dynamically, by means of its astringent effects throughout the whole organism. For the first onset in a suddenly occurring case such non-homœopathic remedies may be useful; but that is all. Considerable hæmorrhages from an internal cause can never be permanently subdued by *alum*.

According to Hecker, "tincture of *cinnamon* has cured innumerable cases of uterine hæmorrhage." Bosh! How many uterine hæmorrhages has not so-called rational medicine fruitlessly striven to cure with tincture of *cinnamon*?* and yet it had rational grounds for such treatment, which was a failure? How well-founded, how rational

employment of non-homœopathic remedies. "In addition to Homœopathic treatment, the rational physician will very seldom find occasion to employ that revolutionizing method, remedies for producing evacuations upwards and downwards, except when quite indigestible or very hurtful foreign substances have got into the stomach or bowels. . . But besides this the employment of some undynamic remedies is sometimes required. Such are fatty substances, which as it were mechanically or physically loosen the connection and closeness of the fibres-tannin which solidifies the living as it does the dead fibre-wood charcoal, which diminishes the bad smell of unhealthy places in the living body, just as it takes it away from lifeless things. Chalk, alkalies, soap and sulphur which are capable of chemically decomposing, neutralizing and rendering innocuous the acrid acids and metallic salts in or upon the human body, and acids and alkalies which have the power of dissolving the various kinds of calculi in the bladder—so also the physically destructive cantery, the chemical decomposing reagents of many kinds—not to mention here the merely depressing, seldom rationally employable venesection, leeches, etc."]

* See the complaints on this subject in *Hufeland's Journal*.

must not such grounds be? Old-wife quackery, single-symptom bungling it is and not rational medicine, to endeavor to combat a *single* symptom like hæmorrhage from the uterus with a medicine, about whose other effects (often quite unsuited for the remaining portion of the hæmorrhagic disease) our modern Æsculapius cares nothing and knows nothing, but (like the bath-women) that it *sometimes* quells uterine hæmorrhage! Oh, rational medicine, thou paragon of all medical wisdom!

If, as soon as they chanced to become aware that *cinnamon*, to which no medicinal powers were credited and which was only used to flavor food on account of its pleasant taste, sometimes checked menorrhagia, they had carefully sought to ascertain its other primary symptoms, we should now be able to decide beforehand in a rational manner the cases in which it can and must always be useful, and those in which it can not. But the Heckerian "*rational medicine*" with its "*old approved fundamental principles*" must continue blindly to administer *cinnamon* in uterine hæmorrhages, and try whether or not it will do good and, like the shepherd quack, "calmly await the good or evil event!"

"When" he continues, "did any one suffer the array of symptoms of dysentery from taking *ipecacuanha*, *gum arabic*, *camphor*, *opium*, etc.? But we can often and at once cure dysentery *when we understand*" (see above the word "judicious" which like this qualification, provides a back-door retreat!) "how to employ each of these remedies in the right place and in the right manner." Does he desire that dysenteric symptoms should be caused by

all these remedies *together* or by each separately? I have not had the advantage of trying them all together or mixed up in one prescription. But if the homœopathic medicinal symptoms of each separately should be desired, I would like first to be shown a severe dysentery that was cured by *ipecacuanha* alone. It would even be difficult to find a dangerous case of autumnal dysentery which was cured by *opium* alone, although moderately severe cases (which among the rustic population often pass off without any medicine) are not infrequently cured by it, because it is almost the only known medicine, which in its primary action causes obstinate constipation, consequently it may in some cases cure homœopathically a disease like dysentery, one of whose chief symptoms is retention of the fæces, provided the accessory symptoms are at the same time not unlike the other symptoms of *opium*.

On *camphor* and *gum arabic* I will not waste a word, nor do I even ask to be shown a severe or moderate case of dysentery cured by them. No doubt a physician who employs all sorts of things at once, and gives a second or a third before the first has exhausted its action, may end by believing that *gum arabic* cures dysentery.

But one word more! The so-called rational medicine makes use of all four and has its sagacious views concerning each! *Ipecacuanha* is to remove, God knows what, morbid inflammatory matter from the stomach, give, God knows what, shock, allay, God knows what, spasm; *gum arabic* plasters over and protects the bowels from the acrid morbid stuff; *opium* is to numb the dysenteric pains and because a large, often excessively large dose of it is re-

quired for this purpose, *camphor* is needed to mitigate the disastrous effects of the overdose of *opium*. A dysentery is thus often partially and single-symptomatically rather lamely removed in accordance with imaginary indications. Were it not that the *opium* in this case is a partially homœopathic remedy, the treatment would not be of any use.

He continues: "No one has ever yet got lead colic from *fatty oils, castor oil, opium, etc.*, but many have been cured by these remedies." How can substances that are not *lead* cause *lead* colic? The very term implies that a *lead* colic is a colic *caused by lead*. Who expects that medicines which cure *lead* colic should cause primary *lead* colic? If they could do this, that is, if they were *lead*, they must, as identical disease-producers, aggravate the malady! That would be to treat the disease tautopathically, to aggravate it, but not to cure it homœopathically. Cannot Hecker understand that much? What does the reader think of it? In order to cure this colic homœopathically what we for the most part only require is a remedy which in its primary action can cause a similar obstinate constipation; such a remedy is *opium*. The physically and mechanically lubricating oil (*Organon*, § 271, note 2), does not belong to the dynamically-acting remedies in these cases, and contributes little to their cure.

After Hecker has adduced these examples, the value of which the reader now knows, he thinks he can triumphantly operate against the *Organon of Rational Medicine*. But he is mistaken! What is really of use in medical

practice, if it be not merely a mechanical or chemical alterant (see *Organon*, § 271, note 2), acts dynamically and virtually, and *always* homœopathically, whether Hecker and his allies see this or not.

Hecker has here collected in carefully considered examples almost all that old physic can, by hook and by crook, rake together of so-called sure remedies, *discovered by accident*; but the homœopathic art can *purposely* discover vastly more than these trifles, remedies appropriate for every special case, if she have before her the positive effects of several medicines, from which she can select a similar artificial disease-force, a suitable remedy for the disease-symptoms present in each case.

The remedies for special cases mentioned by Hecker are for the most part medicines whose positive effects have already appeared in the *Fragmenta*, and their curative power is distinctly homœopathic. But it is not the millionth part of what homœopathic medicine, according to my teaching, can daily and hourly discover, *without waiting, as heretofore, for accident*.

It smacks strongly of the school that Hecker boasts of the few examples he brings forward: "*that they remove the causes of the diseases*, thus manifesting their great superiority over Hahnemann's method."

Folly upon folly! What *a-priori* cause of itch does *sulphur* remove when it cures the itch of wool-workers? What cause of syphilis does *mercury* remove when it cures syphilis? What cause of dysentery or what cause of lead-colic does *opium* remove when it cures one or other of these diseases? Did you see these causes of disease

with your own eyes that you dangle them before ours in such a material form? Or are they not rather changelings and abortions of your imagination? The cause of the disease is in most cases merely an empty scholastic term; all the speculative hypotheses about it are useless for the discovery of the appropriate remedy. It is quite obvious that these diseases are homœopathically cured by these remedies if, after their administration, health speedily followed, as every unprejudiced person must see.

The remainder of what Hecker says there (pp. 236, 237) are mere general theoretical views, which, in concrete cases, never guide to or point out the true, most suitable remedy. They are only pleasant delusions of the helpless imaginative art hitherto in vogue, which serve to invest the empirical routine practice of Hecker and his school with the appearance of rational—folly.

At p. 237 he repeats the objection he had so often made before: "Medicines do not cure symptoms because they make symptoms; the physician can never be justified, on rational principles, in opposing a medicine to a disease merely because, under such and such circumstances, it can cause symptoms which have a similarity to the symptoms of the disease to be cured."

This shallow objection has already been often disposed of. What obstinacy should prevent us crediting to remedies, which really remove diseased states similar to those they are capable of producing in the healthy body, that they effect this cure by similarity of action, seeing that no other reason for their remedial power is apparent? And when, as daily and hourly experience teaches us,

every medicine selected in conformity with the greatest similarity of its positive symptoms to the disease-symptoms *always* and in every case effects a rapid and permanent cure, more rapid and more permanent than any other medicine chosen from any other indication in the world; what should prevent us assuming, with the greatest, almost mathematical, certainty that the most excellent, surest and most evident cure-indication is symptom-similarity (the homœopathic)? What should prevent us regarding this reason for our choice, universally applicable with precision, always providing us with sure help, as the most rational and the most in conformity with nature? seeing that the ordinary treatment can offer as *nothing* instead of it, even distantly resembling it in applicability or rationality, *i.e.*, no hint for the choice of a suitable remedy either congenial to the sound, unadulterated understanding or successful in its results, but relegates us, on the one hand, to the patchwork figments of the hyperphysical scholastic of its systems, and, on the other hand, to routine practice and to the customary blind way of going to work at the sick-bed, where the unfortunate patients are deluged with a hotchpotch of multifarious drugs, which the prescriber has selected, not according to their inner true worth, not according to their positive action ascertained by experience, but according to the fictions of the materia medica, according to accidental discoveries of common folk's practice, according to vague analogy, but often only according to purblind authority, and of which the result, when successful, is precarious and accidental, in most cases palliative, and

an exchange of one evil for another, but in many cases simply lamentable!

I can hear without envy the glorifications the routine practitioners arrogate to themselves, as I am conscious of more assured foundations for my simple and *infinitely* surer cures.

I may mention Hecker's allegation (p. 239) "that by accepting Hahnemann's teaching one would run the risk of prescribing *ipecacuanha* for vomiting and *mercury* for salivation."* What risk! I am astonished! If the retching, not caused by an overloaded stomach, is often, and oftener by any other remedies, indeed in almost every case (when the morbid symptoms do not contraindicate it) really most appropriately and most surely allayed and removed by a particle of *ipecacuanha*, what risk is run in this case? What does the reader think of the ridiculous threat of a risk run by the sure, permanent cure of retching by a minimum dose of *ipecacuanha*?

What if the (rare) non-mercurial salivation be really always when the other symptoms correspond, cured by a minute quantity of a mercurial preparation? Are we to regard this as a misfortune? Seeing that ordinary medical art can often do nothing for it, as it does not treat disease homœopathically? What say you, noble friend of humanity? It would probably be more agreeable to you, that diseases were left uncured, that patients should die, provided homœopathy had not the credit of curing them.

* This appears to me like saying: If one follows good examples one may run the risk of becoming a good man.

A glaring instance of falsification, which Hecker permits himself to make in order to make it appear that I say inconsequent things in direct contradiction to my doctrine, will be found at p. 239. After quoting § 59* from the *Organon* from these words: "What diversity" to the words "in any imaginable respect," wherein it is stated "that diseases cannot be defined in a book or a pathological work, as they are caused by such a variety of concurring external and internal causes, never to be met together again, that an exact reproduction of them is not to be thought of"†—and he ought now to have quoted in its entirety § 60, which is the continuation of the argument, to the effect that "every bodily and mental malady has probably occurred in the world only one single time, and will perhaps never again occur in the world exactly the same"—he falsifies this passage, and, to carry out his unlaudable purpose, he interpolates the following gloss which I had not thought of, and not a word of which is to be found in the *Organon*: "*Just as different must also necessarily be the effects of the medicines,*" so that every case of disease "*and of cure*" has probably occurred only one single time in the world, and will never again occur exactly the same. These words in italics are a pure invention of his own in order to make me seem to contradict myself, and to say that I believe, like Hecker, that medi-

* [There is nothing corresponding to §§ 59 and 60 in the 5th edition. Both paragraphs will be found in the Appendix to my last translation of the *Organon*, pp. 265, 266.]

† This is not a literal quotation of the paragraph in question; it may be regarded as a paraphrase of the original.

cines, owing to the influence of external circumstances, cannot produce corresponding identical symptoms either in health or in disease; and, on the strength of this his falsification of the words of the *Organon*, he sneers maliciously at me thus: "Hahnemann forgets here that from these assertions of his a very unfavorable conclusion must be formed with respect to his doctrine."

I appeal to my honest German countrymen! Does a man deserve the honor of the name of a German, or that of an honorable man who falsifies the text of a book he reviews with interpolated untruthful statements subversive of the teaching of the author, in order, by this unfair trick, to set this teaching in an unfavorable light?

At p. 240, Hecker says: "According to the teaching of the *Organon*, that diseases differ so much that they can hardly occur more than one single time in the world, it follows that the list of homœopathic cures in the *Illustrations* (and in the Introduction to the *Organon*) were also singular in their kind, and hence that neither the treatment nor the remedies can be again imitated." They certainly should not be imitated without consideration, nor could they be; the list is not given with any such intention. It ought only to teach us that other physicians effected cures in conformity with the symptom-similarity of the remedies employed, but they are not put forward for imitation as models of treatment. A rational physician must, when treating every new case, be guided by the totality of the symptoms present, in order that a perfect and rational cure (*i.e.*, precisely in accordance with observable circumstances) may be obtained.

Further on Hecker maunders about things that have no apparent connection with one another. The truth is that the concurrence frequently of a number of injurious external things develops certain diseases in the human body, and that, if we were acquainted with the nature of each of the causes of disease here accumulated, we should be able to perceive that only this and no other disease could result from them. The effect must be as certain and definite here as in other cases, the effect of every cause remains the same. Just as invariable and definite is the effect on each individual one of the artificial morbid forces we term medicines, and they develop definite morbid symptoms as certainly as, in obedience to eternal laws, every effect of a cause must remain the same. It is a palpable falsehood to say that in other places I have denied this maxim. Why does he not point out the places? What does the reader think of such inventions of Hecker?

According to the same unalterable law, according to which a disease *must* result from its producing causes, the definite symptoms of a medicine on the healthy body *must* make their appearance, and, in virtue of these its peculiar definite symptoms, it cures the disease consisting of similar symptoms.

In all his idle talk (p. 241) there prevails a monstrous misunderstanding; he will not understand me and does not understand himself. In § 60 of the *Organon* the subject is only the frequent *production* and *development* of diseases from the conflux of several (simultaneous or successive) exciting causes; it is not said that diseases *already*

developed undergo alteration from every trifling external agency. When once they are formed, the abnormal state (the disease present) is much too strong, too firmly seated in the body to admit of trifling external agencies causing any considerable alteration. The fully formed and active disease runs its course according to its essential nature, as a complete whole.

When one says, from the concurrence of several acids and alkalies and earths there occurs a great variety of neutral salts, this does not mean that there occurs at one time this and at another that neutral salt from a certain acid and a certain alkaline basis. No! There occurs only a definite and always identical neutral salt out of a certain acid neutralized by a certain alkali. Even when three or more acids unite at the same time with several alkalies and some earths, the effect, the neutral saline substance, is always of definite identical character; and, as long as nature lasts, nothing else will result from these same acids and these same alkaline bases. Quite as definite and ever identical must certain diseases result from the conflux of certain (even several) exciting causes if the latter can meet together *in equal number* and equal strength and encounter the same bodily constitution. Identical effects must have identical causes and *vice versa*. Certain injurious forces *must* produce certain diseases, and a certain medicine *must* excite *certain definite* symptoms; the ordinary external things of every-day occurrence and the common conditions of life cannot cause any considerable alteration. But our Hecker is unable to perceive this.

Hecker then adds: "With the degree of certainty of

the effect with which we* combat pneumonia with a venesection in the right place" (see above the word "judicious" and the term "when we understand"), "give *iron* for chlorosis, in short the same may be said of all the methods of treatment mentioned above" (at p. 235, where these empirical single symptomatic treatments have been duly appreciated by me), "we shall never require to treat homœopathically according to symptoms only." How does Hecker know that, since he has never (honestly and impartially) carried out the homœopathic treatment? Will mere empty words suffice to secure the rejection of such grand truths, which never disappoint, which have been corroborated innumerable times by experience? And how often do you not give *iron* in chlorosis without benefit! because you know not the reasons for its employment and cannot judge whether the symptoms of the chlorosis under your care, which you neglect to investigate as beneath your dignity, can or cannot be homœopathically covered by the symptoms of *iron*, which you also think yourself too grand to investigate. Were you guided by the teaching of nature, you could never (as you so often do) prescribe *iron* in one of the chloroses (they vary greatly) without the desired result. But, as things are, your single-symptom treatment remains vain, irrational practice.

Just the same is it, as above observed, with the irrational bloodletting in pneumonia. For want of reasons in conformity with nature (when is bloodletting absolutely

* Hecker and his associates.

required, when not?) you can never change pneumonia rapidly into health with bloodletting alone. Therefore you need not boast of your impotent irrational art, of which you are proud because you are ignorant of the better way!

At p. 242 Hecker gives another example whereby he thinks he will upset homœopathy. "Set forth the symptoms of nymphomania, or of poisoning by *cantharides*,* no one would find in this list of symptoms a rational sufficient ground for giving *camphor*, which never causes those diseases, but as experience shows cures them with certainty." *Camphor* cannot cause these very same diseases, though it be given to cure them, otherwise there would be a tautopathic aggravation and not a homœopathic cure. But in regard to the commonest kind of nymphomania, besides other symptoms corresponding to those frequently met with in this disease, the *camphor*-symptoms observed by others (*Fragmenta*, p. 54, S. 9, 10) and that observed by myself (p. 49) are quite sufficient homœopathic symptoms for the chief symptom of ordinary nymphomania. For the most frequent sufferings caused by *cantharides*, these will be found in the *Fragmenta* (p. 50, S. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and p. 52, S. (4) 5), without mentioning other

* Which of you compiles an accurate list of the symptoms of either of these diseases? One or two manifestations of nymphomania and not much more than the mention of pain on passing the bloody or bloodless urine in poisoning by *cantharides*, is generally enough for you, as you are kept from all precise investigation of symptoms by fashionable levity and ignorance of the importance of accurate semiology.

common symptoms of *cantharides*-poisoning; symptoms very similar to which occur in the pathogenesis of *camphor*. Hecker might have discovered this for himself were it not that he purposely shuts his eyes. Why then the unfounded doubt when the truth is so patent?

At pp. 243 and 244, Hecker again discourses about "blind caprice in homœopathic treatment," without knowing what he is at. But with his routine practice (whose so-called sure remedies have been discovered in quite an irrational way by accident or in the rude treatment of the common people, and cannot be added to by the medical faculty without a like fresh accidental discovery) he cannot perform with certainty a thousandth part of what the homœopathic method daily effects in all cases of disease on principles patent to every one!

"There are," he perorates (p. 244) "in nature no perfectly homœopathic medicines which cause the forms of disease which they are to cure, quite exactly, with perfect completeness of the symptoms, which they, as Hahnemann says, quite cover, as two equal triangles must cover one another." Hecker here seeks to delude the reader with the idea that I had insisted on this perfect covering of disease-symptoms, by medicine-symptoms, and that he was the first to detect this want of completeness. A cunning device! But see, the opposite of this is the truth; Hecker has not the slightest experience of all those things. In the *Organon* (§ 131, note [5th Edit., § 156]) I distinctly stated this want of perfect homœopathy (like the imperfections of all, even the best human inventions), and in precisely the same words as Hecker, in a dishonest manner, pretends

are his own idea: "It is next to impossible that medicine and disease should cover one another symptomatically as exactly as two triangles with equal sides and equal angles." Those are my words, and he seeks to overthrow me with this very statement, just as though he were the first to discover this imperfection. What does the reader think of Hecker's conduct?

How perfect or imperfect homœopathic medicines may be is not a subject that Hecker knows anything about, for he has never occupied himself with it. No one could know more about it than myself, and I had the candor to confess it. The acknowledgment of the defects of human things, in other respects very perfect, does credit to him who makes it. It is the fate of mortal man to remain imperfect here below, and his works share this imperfection, however nearly they may approach perfection. Such is the will of the all-wise Creator. It is honorable in man to admit this. In our case, these small imperfections detract nothing from the value of the homœopathic treatment, as they are inherent in the thing itself, because homœopathy can only make use of a similarity of the symptoms, but not of complete concordance and identity. "This (in good cases) inconsiderable aberration," I have said, "is more than adequately compensated for by the energy of the living organism, and restoration of health goes forward."*

Upon the subject, taken from the more recondite part of the homœopathic system, of the rare, partial cure of

* [This statement is slightly expanded in the 5th edit., § 156.]

chronic maladies, Hecker is not entitled to say a word, as he only knows this system by name (and hardly even that, as we saw above). It (from § 133 onwards [5th Edit., § 162 *et seq.*]) only concerns the case where, among the limited number of medicines yet known as regards their positive symptoms, sometimes a homœopathic remedy, in every respect perfect, cannot be met with. *For such a case it is not the system but the want of provers of medicines that is to blame.* How could one single man have observed *alone* all the positive symptoms of *all* medicines? * Moreover, this kind of treatment is seldom required.

It is, therefore, as unreasonable as it is ridiculous, when Hecker, who never does anything for the truth in medicine, but only utters vain words at random, turns up his nose at things he does not understand, and knows nothing about experimentally. The whole page (244) is full of proofs of this.

I mention (*Organon*, § 146 [5th Edit., § 172]) the *very rare* but *difficult* cases where the disease has too few symptoms. On this, the renowned Hecker, who is self-satisfaction incarnate, says (p. 245): “Rational medicine, as hitherto practised will generally easily dispose of these diseases.” Well, that is what I call an easy way of settling the matter! The routine practice of Hecker and his as-

* [At that time only the *Fragmenta*, containing a few imperfectly proved medicines had been published, but the following year the *Materia Medica Pura* began to appear, which added greatly to the resources of homœopathic practitioners, and Hahnemann was no longer left to conduct the provings unaided.]

sociates easily disposes of these, as it does of all diseases; but how? so that the consequences of their treatment often last for years (see Hufeland on dispensary and hospital practice in his *Journal*, 1810), if death does not make an end of this easy disposal, or some mineral bath prescribed at random.

This, as we have said, very rare kind of diseases, with very few symptoms, Hecker cannot get over. His noble, rational routine practice regards all diseases as almost without symptoms; two or three questions are asked, the tongue inspected, the pulse felt—*nothing!*—a complex, facile prescription is rapidly written, and the doctor takes his leave in order to get quickly away to make more professional visits. How do these practitioners know what and how many, or how few symptoms the disease they thus treat has? Indeed, they tell us quite openly that they do not care for the symptoms (*i.e.*, the observable disease), and do not wish to know anything about them. It would have been better that Hecker had not laid bare here his *partie honteuse*.

One must only know that the noble, rational medicine of Hecker and his friends always seeks to refer mentally the disease under treatment to some general compartment of their pathological system—such is their favorite method of generalizing—without taking much pains to ascertain the symptoms. But in the treatment itself, where none of the little known so-called specific remedies discovered by accident and directed towards a single symptom, such as *cinchona* in intermittent fever, *iron* in chlorosis, *cinnamon* in uterine hæmorrhages, etc., are applicable, and no

palliative, like *opium*, for pains and sleeplessness, purgatives in constipation, etc., can be administered, they fall back on their favorite *general method*. This favorite "general method" (as Hecker himself confesses in his book *On Nervous Fever*, 1808) "can only promote a cure by removing all injurious influences and by bringing the powers and functions of the body to, and maintaining them at, such a height that the disease can, *under favorable circumstances* of the patient and his surroundings—*which, however, are no way dependent on us*—take at least a favorable course. Here we add and subtract" (is that nothing of a partial character?) "in whole and part, and calmly await the good or evil issue." This is what Hecker himself says of his treatment. Can we consider this treatment of all diseases devised on one identical plan, and according to general indications, never susceptible of even tolerable certainty, in which good luck contributes most to any favorable result, as other than an extremely unsatisfactory, inefficient proceeding, consisting solely in trying, which blindly goes for diseases (of unknown nature and never specially considered in all their manifestations) with medicines (with whose special actions the practitioner is unacquainted, and which are often mixed together in one prescription), and calmly awaits the good or evil issue? What conscientious man could remain calm while rendering such a negation of help that has no better support than good luck and his own impotence and ignorance?

Who can consider this sort of practice as wise, as the *non plus ultra* of careful treatment of all the *very various*

diseases? Who can be so lost to all sense of shame as to pretend that such scandalous bungling is "*rational medicine*" on "*old approved principles*," and employ every effort to suppress the obviously better method?

Besides that "calmly awaiting the good or evil issue" so characteristic of the whole Hecker fraternity, who value human life no higher than an empty nut, all the rest is but vain empty flourish. Diseases are not ciphers nor geometrical dimensions, to which we can add and from which we can subtract. This very phrase, shows, by its unsuitability as applied to all that can be called cure, what blind mistakes must ensue through such tentative employment of medicines! "*The functions and powers of the body*" can never be brought in diseases to a *higher degree* or maintained there, without *the disease itself* being diminished or extinguished! To attempt to strengthen the powers, without removing the disease that causes the weakness, is a nonsensical endeavor. The patient can never be strengthened so long as he remains sick. The cure alone strengthens him. But the above Heckerian confession shows that in his practice he does not propose to remove the disease, cannot indeed remove it, and yet he proposes to *strengthen* the patient. This is the way mankind is gulled!

To the passages in the *Organon* (§ 174, note) in which I show convincingly and irrefragably "that symptoms of syphilis must *always* follow the merely local suppression or destruction of the chancre, since the chancre is only a symptom of the general venereal disease already present, and ought to be cured by internal treatment only, if we

wish the patient to be certainly safe from syphilis." Hecker opposes the horrible assertion "that symptoms of syphilis never break out when the chancre has been early enough treated with *appropriate*" (see above the back-door terms "*judicious*"—"when rightly understood"—"*in the right place,*" etc.) "caustic remedies." So that local, early cauterization of the chancre constitutes his rational treatment! What God has revealed to the dear Professor what point of time may be termed *early enough* for the performance of the hazardous operation? And who has shown by irrefragable proofs that a chancre cauterized away ever so early cannot and is not followed by syphilis? Are we to place reliance on such dangerous maxims of routine practice, when all careful and conscientious experience declares the exact contrary? Good God! how fearfully Thou visitest with blindness those who think themselves so wise! Let Hecker bring forward, truthfully, only one single case from his practice, in which a chancre treated solely by local cauterization was not followed by syphilitic symptoms! *Only one single case!*

Yes, if the doctor by mercilessly attributing the breaking out of syphilitic symptoms, often after many months, to a new infection his patient must undoubtedly have incurred, can silence his conscience by this false accusation, and so endeavor to conceal his own shame by unjust reproaches, this may pass muster with the world; but how will it pass with God, and with his own conscience, which if not now, will some time or other prick him? If Hecker had only a moderate practice in venereal disease and did not entertain us with discursive statistical tables about

possible gonorrhœa (he is a great hand at statistical tables) he must have already done a great deal of harm in secret with his treatment of chancre by local cauterization only. God forbid that his recommendation of the mere local cauterization of the chancre should come to the ears of the ordinary practitioner, for this would lead to an increase of this abomination on children and children's children to a much greater extent than previously under the barbers!

I refrain from expressing my feelings about this imperilling of mankind and only say: Every chancre may be cured, without the aid of external remedies and without salivation, merely by internal treatment with the most powerful yet mildest anti-syphilitic mercurial preparations, by all who deserve the name of rational and conscientious medical practitioners. A few days suffice to effect such a cure. This is the only proper and safe mode of treatment of this kind of disease, which I have practiced extensively for thirty years, with the most perfectly satisfactory results. I have never treated a chancre locally but I have never witnessed anything but a permanent cure.

In conclusion (p. 252) Hecker brings forward the subject of *wine*, in order, if possible, to give the *coup de grace* to all kind of confidence in the medicinal symptoms and consequently to homœopathy, because he feels that his previous maunderings, distinguished chiefly by falsehoods and perversions, have failed to accomplish his object of undermining the *Organon*.

In your uncivil attack, dear Hecker, fifteen years ago in your acrimonious yellow *Journal*, pt. xxii., p. 75, on

the first fruit of my impartial investigations, the so-called *New Principle wine* was already the chief war-horse you then rode. You have since then (July number of *Annalen*, p. 50) charged with it against all my other writings on the homœopathic therapeutic method; and now you labor to spur it, lame as it is, once more against the *Organon*. This *wine* you now bring up again as an *experimentum crucis*, in order, if possible, to set the crown on your long hollow argument. “*Wine*, like *opium*, causes on the healthy quite undefinable, dissimilar effects;” this is Hecker’s important objection. We will see what truth there is in this statement. First, we must know what there is in the manifestations of the action of other dynamic medicines that is applicable to *wine*. Now, on this the *Organon* (§ 110*) says: “All the symptoms belonging to a medicine do not appear in one prover, nor yet do all appear at once or on the same day, but some principally on one person, others on another, and so” (and thus the uniform definite totality of the symptoms of a medicine is developed) “that perhaps in a fourth or tenth prover some or many of the symptoms which had been noticed in the second, sixth or seventh prover may appear; nor will they appear precisely at the same hour.” This statement is carried out further in § 111.†

It is on account of this peculiarity of all dynamic

* [There is no aphorism identical with this in the 5th Edit. In the appendix to my translation (at p. 273) the original aphorism of the 1st Edit. will be found.]

† [‡ 135, 5th Edit.]

medicines (which is referable to the different susceptibility of the provers to one or other of the many medicinal symptoms at various periods) that *wine* cannot produce, among a certain number of drinkers, simultaneously, identical emotional effects, identical mental manifestations, identical functional operations.

If, as a general rule, the most frequent effect of *wine* consists in quickened circulation, increased warmth of the body, increased activity of all the functions of the organism and merry pictures of the imagination, which, when they become increased by excess of gradually stronger doses of *wine*, amount to a kind of mental confusion, termed intoxication and drunkenness, and, if the flow of blood to the head becomes excessive, pass into a stupefying, snoring sleep; one cannot expect that all this should occur in every votary of the bottle, because, as before said, all cannot at the same time have the same disposition to develop identical symptoms, and some of the many effects of *wine* are not observed in drinkers who enjoy perfect health of body and mind.

A person who indulges in *wine* at a late hour, when disposed to sleep, must naturally become more lively from a moderate quantity of *wine*, owing to its effect in exciting the circulation.

A person who, before drinking *wine*, has, owing to some excitement, become a loquacious merrymaker, will be homœopathically cured of his eccentricity by a moderate quantity of *wine* and soon become serious and quiet, and, if this condition be increased by a larger quantity, he will become morose.

Just as those who indulge in the daily use of *opium*, on account of the blunting effect of habit to this exciting remedy, do not observe some of the primary symptoms of *opium*, such as excitement, so we must expect that a person who drinks *wine* every day will not experience from a moderate quantity its exciting action on the circulation and the great merriment to such an extent as would one less accustomed to drink *wine*, for to-day's portion must first palliatively remove the after-effects of the *wine* taken yesterday, to wit, drowsiness, laziness, disinclination for work, deficient heat of blood, stupid feeling in the head, and thus only can it first bring him into the normal state of the ordinary man who drinks no *wine*. In this case naturally no primary symptoms are observable, since the power of to-day's moderate allowance of *wine* has, as stated, been expended medicinally.

But if we see weak sensitive children, or other delicate feeble persons who are unused to *wine*, suddenly swallow a large quantity of *wine*, we must not expect in such a case that the ordinary *wine* symptoms will occur in them in their natural order. There ensues (*Organon*, § 113 [5th edit., § 137]) the same as we find with all other dynamic medicines: "When excessively large doses are used there occurs at the same time not only a number of secondary effects among the symptoms, but the primary effects also come on (often mixed with these) in such hurried confusion and impetuosity," etc. In such a delicate person unused to drink *wine*, the sudden ingestion of an excessive quantity of *wine* causes many of the secondary effects of this medicinal liquor to appear from the very

commencement in reverse order; he becomes cold, weeps, loses his intelligence, becomes anxious, weak, vomits, etc. From such a sudden excess of *wine* in a very delicate unaccustomed person we cannot expect a normal succession of the primary symptoms of *wine*, just as we cannot expect to see the primary symptoms of *opium* in their proper order in a person unaccustomed to take *opium*, who has poisoned himself with a drachm-dose of *opium* powder; in such a person there occurs no heat, no increased activity, no intoxication, etc., but like the forerunners of death, the secondary action—icy coldness, cold sweat, paralysis of the senses and muscles, anxiety, convulsions, etc.

And so it is in nature with all sudden excessive quantities; all the symptoms which Ritter, in accord with many other physicists, observed in human beings, from the employment of one or other pole of a moderate voltaic pile, occurred in primary contrary order from his enormous too strong pile. Are then, on that account, the symptoms from moderate *galvanism*, from moderate doses of *opium*, from moderate quantities of *wine* not definite and reliable when observed in healthy persons placed in favorable external circumstances? Yes, they are, to the accurate and careful observer.

Moreover, a drinking bout can never be regarded as a pure proving of the effects of *wine*, because the persons taking part in it, in all other respects are not living according to any dietetic rules. One drinker has a despotic, ill-natured overseer, another has been unfortunate in gambling for high stakes, another is engaged in an amorous

intrigue, a fourth is suffering from jealousy, a fifth is laboring under mortified vanity, a sixth and seventh have previously indulged in unwholesome food or liqueurs. How can all these accessory circumstances, which powerfully affect the health, leave the proving pure?

Besides, how seriously cannot even a small quantity of *wine*, by its chemical decomposition in a stomach with a great tendency to acidity, by the rapid development of acid, derange the whole man in his emotional disposition, give him headache, vomiting and other ailments, which *are not and cannot be* the peculiar symptoms of *wine*!

What an enormous difference is there not to be found among the drinks which are called *wine*, from the sour country liquor, which cannot make a man happy or cheerful, to the genuine ambrosial Johannisberger—from the red Naumburger, doctored so as to pass for Burgundy, to the genuine Oeil de Perdrix—from the Malaga adulterated with arrack to Imperial Tokay!

Are all these liquors the same sort of *wine*? can any sensible person expect the same effects from them? Are the phenomena observable in a lot of wine drinkers who are subject to no dietetic regularity in their living, and no moderation in their external conditions, to be regarded as pure provings of the real effects of genuine wine by healthy persons not under the influence of foreign medicinal forces?

The ordinary routine practitioner pays as slight regard to these sources of inevitable alteration of the effects of *wine*-drinking (or of the daily use of *opium*) as he does to the many other things in the medical art demanding con-

sideration and attention. But the fault lies not in the indefinite and variable symptoms of *wine* or of the other dynamic medicines, but in himself.

It is infinitely easier to contradict than to investigate, infinitely easier to sneer at truths and to present them in a repulsive light by misrepresentations and falsifications than to devote one's whole life, as I have done and continue to do, to the laborious and conscientious search for truth by faithful observation of the nature of things in the most careful trials, and the unprejudiced application of their results to the welfare of humanity.

NOTE.—The portrait of Hahnemann in this work is from a mezzotint engraving of the picture by W. G. E. Hering, painted from sittings given to him in Paris a year or two before Hahnemann's death. It is the best portrait taken of the great Reformer of Medicine, and is considered by those who knew the original in his latter days to be an excellent likeness.



